

JPRS-WER-84-027

8 March 1984

# West Europe Report

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

8 March 1984

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## TERRORISM

## TURKEY

- Arrest of DEV-YOL Militants in Istanbul  
(TERCUMAN, 4 Jan 84) ..... 1

## POLITICAL

## EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

- Asylum Seekers From Asia, Africa Creating New Problems  
(Elisabeth Randsborg; AFTENPOSTEN, 11 Jan 84) ..... 3

## CYPRUS

- Soysal Urges Greater TRNC Pressure for Settlement  
(Mumtaz Soysal; MILLIYET, 4 Jan 84) ..... 6

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Schily Sees Greens' Choice: Protest or Change  
(Karl-Heinz Krumm; TAGESSPIEGEL, 24 Jan 84) ..... 8
- Conservative Assessment of Green Turmoil  
(Lothar M. Marscheid; RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT,  
20 Jan 84) ..... 11
- Greens Attempt Clarification of Doctrine, Goals  
(Martin Winter; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 27 Jan 84) ..... 14
- Bavaria Pushes Hard Line on Resident Foreigners  
(Egon Scotland; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 26 Jan 84) ..... 18
- Stuttgart Sets Curbs on 'Marriageable Turks'  
(Peter Henkel; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 26 Jan 84) ..... 20

Greens Sustain Tentative Party Unity in Hessen (D. Guratzsch; DIE WELT, 6 Feb 84) .....	22
Communist League Penetration of Greens Detailed (Detlef Ahlers; DIE WELT, 27 Jan 84) .....	24
National Council Raps Green/SPD Link in Hessen (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 23 Jan 84) .....	26
Lower Saxony Greens Shift Stance on 'Rotation' (Hans-Peter Sattler; DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 10 Jan 84) .....	27
FINLAND	
Frictions Begin To Appear in Governing Coalition (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates) .....	30
Center, Rural Parties Mutually Irritated, by Janne Virkkunen Middle Parties Announce Cooperation Sorsa Attacks Bourgeois Alliance SDP, Nonsocialists Continue Struggle	
GREECE	
Analysis of Current PASOK-KKE Cooperation (Giorgios Botsis; KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 15 Jan 84).	36
Analysis of PASOK's 'Antidemocratic' Mentality (N. D. Delipetros; POLITIKA THEMATA, 13-19 Jan 84) .....	40
Interparty Parliamentary Debate Over KYP's Status (I KATHIMERINI, various dates) .....	44
SPAIN	
Pujol Reveals CIU Economic, Social Platform (J. Andreu; AVUI, 28 Jan 84) .....	51
Assessment of Sixth Popular Alliance Congress (Francisco Lopez de Pablo; YA, 30 Jan 84) .....	54
TURKEY	
Birand on Key Barometers in 1984 Relations With West (M. Ali Birand; MILLIYET, 31 Jan 84) .....	57
Ulman Assesses Turkish Status in COE (Haluk Ulman; DUNYA, 31 Jan 84) .....	59
MDP's Sunalp on Political Health of Party (Fatih Gullapoglu; CUMHURIYET, 31 Jan 84) .....	62



## MILITARY

### FRANCE

- Air Force Engineers' Role in Runway, Airfield Construction  
(Frederic Dony; AIR ACTUALITES, Jan 84) ..... 64

### SPAIN

- Inclusion of Reference to NATO Urged in Defense Blueprint  
(ABC, 7 Feb 84) ..... 69

## ECONOMIC

### BELGIUM

- National Bank on Government Policy, Lack of Investments  
(Pierre Effinier; LE SOIR, 17 Feb 84) ..... 71

- Planning Bureau on Unemployment in 1988  
(Guy Depas; LE SOIR, 17 Feb 84) ..... 75

### GREECE

- 'Peiraiki-Patraiki' Official on Industrial Crisis  
(Aris Katsambas Interview; OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS,  
No 1547, 29 Dec 83) ..... 77

### SPAIN

- Spanish Official on Economic Cooperation With Tunisia  
(Jose Luis Pardos Interview; LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE,  
19 Jan 84) ..... 82

- Industrial Credit Bank Opens Bilbao Branch  
(EGIN, 26 Jan 84) ..... 85

### TURKEY

- World Bank Secret Report on Turkish Housing  
(CUMHURIYET, 24 Jan 84) ..... 86

- Sectoral Assessment of 24 January Policy  
(CUMHURIYET, 24 Jan 84) ..... 88

- In-Depth Analysis of Stagnant Mining Industry  
(Behzat Firuz; TERCUMAN, 6 Feb 84) ..... 91

## ENERGY

### NETHERLANDS

- High Electricity Prices Affect Competitiveness  
(NRC HANDELSBLAD, 13 Jan 84) ..... 96

### TURKEY

- Survey, Foreign Exchange Benefits of TKI Projects  
(DUNYA, 17 Jan 84) ..... 98

## ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

### SPAIN

- Sant Carles Oil Exploration Sparks Ecological Furor  
(Gloria Escrig; AVUI, 28 Jan 84) ..... 102

## ARREST OF DEV-YOL MILITANTS IN ISTANBUL

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 4 Jan 84 pp 1, 10

[Text] In a series of operations carried out by Public Security Branch squads of the Istanbul Security Directorate, 35 communist militants, 4 of them women, were arrested, all members of DEV-YOL, recognized as one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations. Fourteen guns of various makes and calibers, a large quantity of ammunition, two kilograms of gold acquired in jewelry store robberies, important organization documents and subversive leftist literature were confiscated at the quarters of the communist militants, who are responsible for more than 20 incidents of robbery, murder, injury, theft, posting signs, arson and bombing in Istanbul prior to and after 12 September. Mehmet Cemal Carmikli, his brother Metin Carmikli, Hayati Akbas, Omer Gumus and Kemal Ozer, members of the uncovered organization's military wing, murdered jeweler Behnan Temelli in Gungoren, injured four persons and engaged in frequent armed clashes with security forces in the course of their robberies and clandestine meetings, it was determined. Kemal Ozer, a leader and one of the bloodiest activists of the DEV-YOL military wing who was known inside the organization by the code name "Cengiz-Kivircik" was discovered to have been involved in the earlier killing in Ankara of three attorneys who were members of the former NAP, two of whom were Huseyin Cahit Akuzum and Ahmet Kutluay, and also in the incident in which Bulent Ozturkmen, deputy undersecretary of the Trade Ministry, was injured.

The organization's female militants obtained funds for the organization by selling the jewelry acquired in the robberies to jewelry stores in various quarters of the city. These women include Zehra Carmikli, the wife of the currently imprisoned DEV-YOL activist Sakir Carmikli and niece of Mehmet Cemal Carmikli and Metin Carmikli.

## Women Cashed in Gold to Aid Bloody Organization

In an extensive investigation of the armed robbery of a jewelry store in Sisli Gultepe, detectives from the Public Security Branch Felony Department first apprehended two female militants, university students named Zehra Carmikli and Ozden Kursun, who attempted to sell a gold necklace to a jeweler in the Covered Bazaar. Security forces, guided by the information supplied by these militants during interrogation, staked out the organization's houses and prearranged rendezvous points and captured the other members. Also found at the cell houses were counterfeit stamps and cachets of various government offices, false identity papers and a truck belonging to the organization purchased with money obtained in

robberies. It was also revealed that Gokalp Ciftcioglu, who had died in an earlier clash with security forces and was known to be involved in many thefts, robberies and killings in Ankara, had an active part in the Istanbul jewelry store robberies. Authorities said this was their first encounter with the practice by a terrorist organization of melting down the gold stolen from jewelry stores at its headquarters and having female agents try to sell it.

Five Street Vendors, 11 Students

Identities and occupations of the arrested militants are:

1. Zehra Carmikli (Student)
2. Metin Carmikli (Street vendor)
3. Hayati Akbas (Student)
4. Ali Timurlenk (Street vendor)
5. Soysal Ekinici (Civil servant)
6. Kemal Ozer (Student)
7. Mehmet Yesiltepe (Student)
8. Omer Gumus (Truck driver)
9. Ahmet Aksoy (Student)
10. Suleyman Ates (Street vendor)
11. Ahmet Ates (Street vendor)
12. Nurettin Ates (Street vendor)
13. Inayet Kocak (Trade)
14. Yusuf Yildirim (Trade)
15. Irfan Erdemoglu (Civil servant)
16. Kamber Tanriverdioglu (Civil servant)
17. Sakir Togan (Trade)
18. Sefer Arslan (Civil Servant)
19. Hasan Gecgin (Worker)
20. Latife Gecgin (Accountant)
21. Ali Surucu (Worker)
22. Omral Surucu (Housewife)
23. Namik Kemal Aydin (Engineer)
24. Fehmi Yorulmus (Worker)
25. Kemal Gumus (Truck driver)
26. Aytemur Dogan (Student)
27. Recep Aktas (Student)
28. Isa Cimen (Worker)
29. Umide Celik (Student)
30. Ismail Kaplan (Trade)
31. Mehmet Cemal Carmikli (Student)
32. Ali Ates (Student)
33. Vahap Karatas (Student)
34. Haydar Uncu (Civil servant)
35. Mustafa Kilic (Trade)

8349

CSO: 3554/121

## ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ASIA, AFRICA CREATING NEW PROBLEMS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Jan 84 p 60

[Article by Elisabeth Randsborg: "Asylum Seekers in Norway"]

[Text] The year 1983 brought a new acute refugee problem to Europe: asylum seekers. They come by the hundreds of thousands from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Africa and seek protection and asylum in Western European countries. They can not immigrate in a traditional manner because Western European boundaries are difficult to cross. Only a few are granted refugee status. The majority live in uncertainty while their applications for asylum are processed. That can take years. West Germany has 100,000 asylum seekers, Switzerland has 8,000, and Italy, 4,000. In the last year Norway has also noticed the new stream of asylum seekers. The majority are Ethiopians. There are 110 individual applications for asylum now awaiting processing by the Justice Department.

"This is a new development which is causing great problems for certain Western European countries. More and more countries are imposing visa requirements and limiting immigration to a minimum. But persons who are seeking political asylum cannot be deported and they are allowed to remain in the country until their applications are processed. Only the rarest of these asylum seekers can meet United Nations standards for refugee status and cannot be viewed as refugees in traditional terms. The processing of asylum applications takes a long time--in certain countries up to several years."

This was told to AFTENPOSTEN by Roger Walon, director of the information department of the international migration organization, ICM [Intergovernmental Committee for Migration]. In response to the request of West German authorities, ICM has started a project to relieve the situation.

"West Germany has more than 100,000 asylum seekers. It can take up to two years before an application for asylum is processed, and extremely few are granted asylum. In the interim the asylum seekers have sunk roots in the country and survived in any manner possible. We have now initiated a return migration process whereby we attempt to help those who have waited a long time for, or who have been denied, asylum. Either we find a third country which is willing to receive the asylum seeker or else we assist the seeker in returning to his or her native country if the possibility for a safe life exists there," states Walon.

During the course of 1983, 14,000 asylum seekers in West Germany were helped by the ICM project. The organization is to start a similar program in Belgium which also has a large number of asylum seekers.

"Half of those who have participated in the project have migrated and settled in a new third country. The other half have chosen to return to their native land."

#### More to Norway

Italy, Switzerland and Sweden are other countries with large numbers of asylum seekers. In 1983, a marked increase in the number of asylum seekers from Ethiopia could also be noticed in Norway.

"These are often individuals who have been involved in the fight for independence in Eritrea. They emigrate to Sudan or other countries and come eventually to Norway," Per Christoffersen, an adviser in the Justice Department, told AFTENPOSTEN.

It is the Justice Department which rules on the asylum applications, and at present, the department has 110 applications to be decided.

"It takes from six months to one year to process an application for asylum here in Norway. Up to 1981, a total of 110 Ethiopian refugees had come to Norway. The past year, however, we have seen a marked increase, and during the course of 1983 alone, some 60 applications for asylum by Ethiopians were processed," states Christoffersen.

Those asylum seekers who can demonstrate with any degree of probability that they are refugees are allowed to remain in the country until the application is processed. The majority are granted temporary work permits while the application is being processed. Some--those who are unable to convince the authorities that they are serious asylum seekers--must survive on minimum grants from the social welfare office.

#### Many Rejections

Christoffersen emphasizes that each application for asylum is processed individually.

"Nonetheless, the majority of Ethiopian applications for asylum are rejected. Either they are granted residence and work permits on humanitarian grounds or we investigate whether the person in question has been in a so-called first country of asylum. To the extent possible, the person is returned there. But in contrast to the Swedes, we are reluctant to send Ethiopians back to Sudan."

Refugees in Western Europe cluster together.

"As a result of unemployment, we have noticed a significant shifting of refugees. There is no doubt that many come to the Nordic countries. They



clearly have discovered that it is better to be an unemployed refugee here than, for example, in Italy and West Germany," says Christoffersen.

The number of individual asylum applications was greater in 1983 than the year before. There were 110 individual applications for asylum which were processed; 31 of those were granted while 80 were denied asylum but were given residence and work permits. Five were denied both asylum and residence.

#### More Liberal

The director of the National Immigration Office, Carl-Hugo Lund, told AFTENPOSTEN that the alien-control authorities had instituted more liberal practices three months ago.

"There has been considerable publicity about certain of our decisions. In order to demonstrate that it is not a matter of prestige ~~on our part~~, we would rather allow asylum seekers to enter the country so that they can remain here for the time that it takes to process the case within the department. Even though the applicant is not granted asylum, it is often the case that they obtain a residence permit, and thereby, an official "B" status. We see a tendency toward abuse of the institution of asylum and a dilution of the concept. In my opinion, it is this aspect which is alarming," Lund states.

12578  
CSO: 3639/62



## SOYSAL URGES GREATER TRNC PRESSURE FOR SETTLEMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 4 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Mumtaz Soysal in column "Angle": "Limits of Good Will"]

[Text] Nothing in the world has been so sorely tried as the patience of the Turkish Cypriots.

Even disregarding the time prior to 1974, that time when frustration turned patience into the use of force, every hope since has become only a betrayal, every opening has seen only treachery. Instead of even the tiniest step toward re-establishing mutual trust, a stubborn attitude demanding Turkish subjugation has kept compromise of any kind at bay. Offer what you will, they always say, "It is not enough."

However, if they again say "It is not enough" to the new package of proposals which Denktas announced yesterday, complete with the military pull-out by Ankara, it will be the straw that breaks the back of good will.

Why? Because this package is so "generous" it makes you wonder.

Let's take Maras [Varosia].

Varosia, which the Greek Cypriots abandoned in 1974, was kept closed, with its large hotels and modern conveniences, as a region to relinquish to the other side in the first compromise. As long as the talks dragged on, proposals to break this lock in favor of the Greek Cypriots and to open the area to settlement by them without waiting for a final solution were never accepted. The Greek Cypriots did not want government of the region in Turkish Cypriot hands even temporarily and refused the offer of Varosia for nothing in return, with no compromise reached.

Denktas is now backing down from even temporary Turkish administration and agreeing to relinquish the region to "temporary UN observation and administration." The conditions of the turn-over procedure are to be decided between the United Nations and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNP] alone, and Greek Cypriots are to move in as soon as talks towards a comprehensive settlement begin.

What more could anyone want?

Once more it is proposed that the Nicosia Airport be opened to joint use and temporarily administered by the United Nations. Moreover, the Turkish side is now giving up the idea of equality in this regard, accepting for the time being formulas for operation of the airport which the United Nations would devise.

This, too, is to be a matter for separate discussion and ways to reach agreement will be sought with the United Nations alone, if not with the Greek Cypriots.

What more could anyone want?

These aspects are not all there is to the proposal package; when you look over the other points, concerned with the "committee on missing persons" and a final settlement, you cannot help but ask yourself again and again: "What more could anyone want?"

What is wanted is for Greek Cypriot domination of the entire island to be presented on a golden platter.

For a past filled with injustice, discrimination and criminal acts to be forgotten.

As long as sovereignty is not handed back on a golden platter, the stonewalling will continue. The entire Western world has joined in the chorus of "This is not enough," and the "American plan," the "German plan," the "Common Market plan" have followed every package of proposals demanding an incredible shopping list of new concessions. Finally, the \$76.5-million cut in American aid is as if to say, "If you would give in on Cyprus, we could make up the cut elsewhere."

There is only one way to put an end to these shopping lists: Issue an ultimatum with the proposals saying, "Accept them by such-and-such a date or forget them forever." Things would be a lot different, for instance, if the Turkish side were to say, "If you're going to move into Varosia, go ahead and move in, or else we will start running the hotels after this date."

This is what is lacking in Denktas' plan.

8349

CSO: 3554/120

## SCHILY SEES GREENS' CHOICE: PROTEST OR CHANGE

Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 24 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Karl-Heinz Krumm: "Green Protest Not Enough for Him"]

[Text] One day exactly after the caucus session of the Greens Bundestag faction, which had been unexpectedly disappointing because of the harsh criticism from Gert Bastian, Otto Schily, one of the three spokesmen of the Greens in Bonn, gets a letter that gives him confidence. The point is that the writer of that letter reports on talks in the GDR: "There are many people too placing great hopes on the Greens."

Otto Schily is talking about this small event, this rapid back and forth between disappointment and encouragement, as if this were typical of the work of the Greens as such. Of course, he says, his party's parliamentary group has difficulties, for its thin veneer of personnel alone, overtaxed so often with the organizational work, so that he himself, much like Gert Bastian, sometimes gets "annoyed with all the long debates about minor matters." "The Greens," he says, "are a very German party all right in every respect."

Such pronouncements, to be sure, are not an expression of disappointment by someone who, after the March 1983 elections, arrived at the "rotten political landscape" of Bonn and was able to gain "fluctuating experiences" there since. Rather, he thinks the other parties meanwhile meet the Greens with more respect than initially because, in spite of all justified criticism of the Greens and their ills, "we are very proud of the results of our work; we are placing our fingers on the wounds of society."

Molded in Berlin

Otto Schily's political development, he being the son of a Bochum foundry manager, mainly took place in Berlin, where he during the ApO years sympathized openly with the SDS, together with Horst Mahler and others founded the Republican Club, and later even ventilated once with Rudi Dutschke the forming of a leftist-socialist party. Yet in all these political processes he rather played the role of an unorganized participant, an observer, who would also take his cues from the existing parties. For a while he even kept an SPD membership application in his pocket but then realized that "the SPD is too much a social conformist, too much stabilizes existing structures."

As Gudrun Ensslin's defense counsel at the Stammheim RAF trial, Otto Schily was branded "enemy of the people over night." He had to bear disappointments and injuries in excess and still today admits, after so long a phase of distance and reflection, "deep scars" have remained from that time.

Along with that trend, which this properly dressed attorney with refined manners refers to as his "liberal, radical democratic component," he early gained a deep understanding for ecological problems, preshaped in his parental home.

One experience affected Schily strongly in the late 1970's when, shortly before the intended founding of the Alternative List he turned his back to it because he thought the Maoist KPD seeking to push into it was just looking for a little green cloak. But that had been a mistake, he frankly admits, because in the new group the KPD adherents had soon been released from their ideological rigidity. Why, he asks in applying that experience to the current situation, "should it not also be possible to dissolve such hardening in dialogue with the SPD as well?"

Though Schily "greatly understands" the fundamentalists among the Greens and their objection that one could not, on account of cooperating with the SPD, abandon one's own basic positions, he yet staunchly defends the talks with the SPD because it would be a start in soon presenting the Greens "and mainly also the SPD with a fitness test." One could not as a Green, he says, always, and rightly, point to the urgent social problems and the little time left for their solution while, in principle, remaining in the opposition. "The fundamentalists among us must say," Schily frankly says, "when and how they want to solve the problems of society."

Because no answer to that has thus far been forthcoming, self-assured Schily focuses on other tactical and substantive considerations. "In an emergency you may have to climb out of a window when the house is afire," is the way he describes the situation. Therefore he tenaciously pleads for the Greens to try through negotiations with the SPD to realize at least some of their ideas, so as to show that those ideas are by no means utopias. This in turn, he hopes concretely, would harvest a larger vote in the next election through which, in new negotiations, more demands could be made to prevail.

This is, so it seems, the march through the institutions as proclaimed after the ApO era, with a different explanation for it. Mere protest, Schily is afraid, dissipates quickly and is for that very reason no tolerable basis for successful long-range policy.

A considerable measure of self-assurance, to be sure, also is betrayed by Schily's admonition to the SPD it should not look at the Greens as a little patch on its own armor, as a "sort of green FDP." "Because we do want to change our society from the bottom up," he said. If the Hessian Prime Minister Holger Boerner announced an alliance with the Greens was conceivable only without the SPD losing its identity in the process, "the same holds true for us." But he advises, full of self-assurance, his friends in the young party of the Greens to show more confidence about their own programs "because our basic understanding is a good foundation for the work we have begun. No danger for the Greens to lose their profile through cooperating with the SPD."

## Praise for Bastian

Schily knows for many of his political friends he is not exactly a Green prototype, if alone for his outward manner, his mode of acting and arguing. Yet even in this sundry mix of personalities, the young party differed from the others "with their uniform mouse-grey attires."

For the controversial rotational principle in the parliamentary group, Schily's comment continues to be double - barreled when he says he is for it but against the principle itself. The Greens too, he explains, need identification through persons, not through programs: "Federal policy is impossible without continuity in personnel."

Gert Bastian, the critic of the work in the parliamentary group, he calls a courageous man deserving of high regard. What he had said about the party, however, he should have to think about once more in quiet. The disputes would however be settled, says Schily, "in a proper political and humane manner." In the case of Hecker, who got national headlines under the mean slogan "Busen-grabscher" [bosom grabber], "we have made great mistakes," he adds pensively.

After 10 months of hard work in the Bonn parliament, Otto Schily never regrets having come over from Berlin; annoyance now and then is more than made up for "by admiring the work our parliamentary group has done." He was stubbornly seeking to reserve at least the weekends for being in his cherished Berlin, says this man, now 51 years of age. Not only his political life, his personal life as well was full of problems in Bonn; such are the experiences of a novice in the FRG capital.

5885

CSO: 3620/175



## CONSERVATIVE ASSESSMENT OF GREEN TURMOIL

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 20 Jan 84 p 5

[Article by Lothar M. Marscheid: "Rape or Wangling"]

[Text] Personnel Policy and Rotation Do Not Suit Gert Bastian--Democracy from Way Below Also Burdens His Colleagues

As usual, Otto Schily was a bit ahead of his friends. No sooner had the Hessian Land assembly set the switches last weekend in Usingen/Taunus for a permanent cooperation with Holger Boerner's Social Democrats than Otto Schily asked the federal Greens also to seek a red-green alliance for Bonn. Peter Glotz, who manages the SPD's federal business, reacted cautiously: "We are not talking coalitions right now, we are talking politics."

The SPD executive, no doubt, does not want to act precipitously. The Hessian development does, to be sure, fit seamlessly into the long-term embracement concept of party chairman Willy Brandt. Opposition leader Jochen Vogel likewise welcomed the Usingen decision as a piece of "politification and parliamentarization" of the Greens. Even so, at this moment they deem more of a rapprochement toward the environmental protectors neither necessary nor tactically prudent. One has to keep one's own constituency in mind, after all.

Already the SPD has exacted a lot from it. For a long time they dismissed the warnings against red-green coalitions as groundless and as insidious CDU propaganda tricks. Still right before the Hessian Landtag elections, Holger Boerner wanted no part of a hanky-panky with the "chaotics," whom he once had threatened with a lanky lath. Now the upset constituency has to acknowledge that Boerner is certifying the Greens for a "learning ability" and for having the stuff for a profitable partnership. The suspicion of opportunism lies close.

For all that, this matter of the eco-disciples' "learning ability" is not so far-fetched. The Greens are indeed in the midst of a radical change. The longer they are sitting on parliamentary benches, the greater becomes the temptation to swear off fundamentalist-oppositional principles and yield to the enticements of power. The corrupting realization that he who also wants a say-so has to have a share in the government finds more and more adherents in the alternative camp.

This new trend now also broke through in the membership in Usingen. When Landtag deputy Karl Kerschgens raised the cardinal question whether they wanted to act as yeast in politics or let the yeast freeze in the refrigerator, a broad majority was found giving the Landtag parliamentary group carte blanche for further negotiations with Boerner. The fundamentalists, who would accept parliament, at best, as a rumpus haven and shy away, like Satan from Holy Sacrament, from the slightest touch by the "fatal industrial Moloch and his agents" (Rudolf Bahro), were left beaten by the wayside.

#### Eying the Specter of Decline

The Green's turning point has multifaceted causes. There first is that vexing sentiment to have reached the limit by the strategy of refusal. In Bonn, e.g., the novices had accomplished practically nothing in their one year parliamentary tenure. The last Landtag elections evoked the specter of decline. In Hamburg, those of the alternative ran into the fiasco suddenly no longer to be needed for forming a majority after several months of negotiations with the SPD. Furthermore, the government change in Bonn has relined the importance of a relationship with the SPD. Helmut Schmidt, the Greens' prototype of a soulless technocrat, has no role to play anymore in the SPD. With the sensitive Willy Brandt, on the other hand, the Greens are feeling comfortable. The way in which the SPD chief overturned Schmidt's old security policy line and joined the "peace movement" has greatly reduced the emotional distance from the SPD. The SPD, most eco-disciples' object of love-hatred, has become a conceivable coalition partner for the Greens.

Not only in Hessen can the effects be sensed. Red-green partnerships are being prepared over a broad range. The Greens in North Rhine/Westphalia recently suggested a coalition with the SPD after the 1985 Landtag election. The Saarland chapter is moving in the same direction.

The fundamentalists accuse the Hessian parliamentary group to have sacrificed solid campaign positions such as closing down all nuclear reactors completely and categorically opposing the western runway, to rotten compromises. And more than that: "Constantly wallowing in in power tactics calculations" had made the movement of the Greens resembled "establishment" parties more and more.

On its top floors, the SPD is watching the green convulsions with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it notes with gratification that Willy Brandt's vision of a majority above and beyond the CDU is coming closer, step by step, to reality--at least in one federal state. Especially highly is being rated that of all places it happens to be Hessen, under the soberly bourgeois Holger Boerner, that is acting as the outrider (and not, say, Oskar Lafontaine's Saar SPD).

On the other hand, Bonn's SPD executive fully acknowledges the risks of that undertaking. For years they have been preaching in election campaigns that a vote for the Greens was a lost vote. Now they have virtually given away that argument. They also know well enough that the Green's movement is an amorphous mass, without leadership, filled with controversy, unaccountable, and thus of highly dubious value in terms of a permanent partnership. How well called for doubts in the stability of the Greens are is attested to by Bundestag deputy



Gert Bastian's threat to resign, which has plunged the Greens into a deep crisis, alone for the fact that other leading companions like Petra Kelly share Bastian's criticism.

### The Rotation Principle as Stumbling-block

Embarrassing to the Greens, for one thing, is Gert Bastian's complaint about the personnel policy of communist groups in the green spectrum. There is indeed no dearth of indications for that. Last summer, e.g., Hamburg's AL (Alternative List) by a large majority advocated supporting the BAL (Industrial-Alternative List), putting up candidates with DKP involvement for the citizenry elections in Bremen. To the leftist TAGESZEITUNG (TAZ) that proved "how the DKP is sneaking into the alternative election movement." The influence coming from the Z faction, stemming from the former CL (Communist League)--one of its representatives being Bundestag deputy Juergen Reents--also showed up in the Greens' disarmament campaign.

Insupportable trouble with the basic democratic concept the Green deputies have to live with causes increasing annoyance. Especially the basic principle of rotation set down in January 1983, in the so-called "Sindelfinger Resolutions," is becoming more and more of a stumbling-block. This principle envisages replacing each deputy after 2 years by successors after they first have formed an office liaison with the incumbents to work themselves in.

These office liaisons cause numerous conflicts. They, as Bastian writes in his letter, cause "losses in performance and competitive situations in which the incumbents and the future incumbents regard themselves rather as opponents than as partners." To endure that situation quite a few Green MPs are all the less inclined in that their successors often excel by absolute inadequacies.

A special clause in the Sindelfinger Resolutions makes for further discord. According to that one, a deputy can avoid the rotation if the Land chapter by a 70-percent majority authorizes his full tenure. "Those who made that decision evidently knew nothing of the human psyche," says the leftist TAZ. The point is that the 70-percent backdoor seduces many deputies into constantly providing evidence for their being irreplaceable. The consequence is that there evolves "a preventative game of profiling" (so says the Bonn parliamentary spokesman Heinz Suhr) which is diametrically opposed to the Greens' idea of egalitarian politics.

Habituation to parliamentary work, constant friction with the base, and the natural enticements of power in their sum total bring it about quite naturally that the Greens, as far as they are incumbents, seek a firm hold through concrete forms of political cooperation with the SPD. The disputes have not yet ended. The price is high. Green "realists" of the sort of Joschka Fischer, who runs the parliamentary business in Bonn, are all set to pay it. Fischer said: "Politics is rape or wangling. We Greens have opted for the way of reform, of sharing power, and that also means wangling. Whoever claims it is not so is lying."

## GREENS ATTEMPT CLARIFICATION OF DOCTRINE, GOALS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Martin Winter: "Further Shifts Toward the SPD?"]

[Text] "The Greens did not aim at having four instead of three established parties." Lukas Beckmann is visibly concerned about his party's condition. Managing the Greens' business since the party was founded in 1979, he now finds some "Realpolitiker" steering a course that makes the "Greens lose face and perish for lack of profile."

His worries are shared by many executive Greens--if for very different reasons. When Otto Schily, one of the spokesmen in the Greens' Bundestag parliamentary group, on public TV ventilated the thought the Greens might become the SPD's junior partner in 1987 and Gert Bastian's letter caused a great stir in the parliamentary group and in the party, it could no longer be hidden that the still young party was being shaken by fierce disputes on its identity, program and further political course.

The 4 years since its founding, providing the Greens with so many surprising successes at the voting booths, seem not to have been long enough, as it were, to turn the sundry mix of highly diverse groups and initiatives into a uniformly profiled party with consensus about its practical politics.

Now, with the Greens having a chance to come to power, as in Hessen, and polls among the voters signaling a further strengthening of the Greens in the future, old conflicts are opening up again. What is all too often forgotten over their topical political successes is that this party of the ecologists has been and is the only attempt thus far in FRG history to gather most diverse social movements into one political force.

There are rather conservative groups that found their way into politics via the environmental protection problems. There are citizen initiatives that solely through the dispute over nuclear power or the dying of the woods found their way to the Greens. There are all sorts of leftist groups, coming out of the students and alternative movements, that had tried in vain for years to found a party. And then there are the disappointed pragmatists with the radical democratic focus who had turned away from the SPD (and some also from the FDP) during the Social-Liberal era. And others came in who were committed to the peace movement and found the Greens the only party truly opposing rearmament.

All these groups and currents were at one against the policy and, above all, the practical conduct of the "establishment parties." Environmental protection, peace policy and civil rights have been and are the most important themes of the new movements and of the Greens; rejecting the professional political behavior by the other parties is something else they have in common. Annoyance with the parties was the catchphrase. As long as the Greens were in no danger of having to prove their political intentions in practice, the consensus was holding.

Now the joints are becoming brittle, however. The Hessian Greens' decision to work together with the SPD has evoked vehement criticism from the National Executive Committee and the National Council. In some Land chapters and in parts of the Bundetag parliamentary group, it is, however, being welcomed, as an "acid test for the Greens and the SPD," as Otto Schily says. He hopes it will start something. Like him, other advocates of the Hessian line also hope the Greens will be able to prove in Wiesbaden that they can push through some of that for which they were elected, whereby, they hope, their election chances will improve. Schily expects a higher proportion of the vote, once the citizens can "see we have accomplished something." Those who oppose that policy, however, fear the very opposite election effect. Precipitous collaboration with the SPD would lead to loss of profile and, hence, to voters going elsewhere.

The rejection front against the Hessian line ranges from Petra Kelly via the Frankfurt eco-fundamentalists to the Greens in Hamburg who are coming out of the tradition of leftist radical groups. This politically surprising constellation opens up a new line of dispute among the Greens. The old pattern of a contrast between the fundamentalists and the "Realpolitiker" no longer seems to hold.

Rainer Trampert, national executive spokesman of the Greens from Hamburg, finds, next to the fundamentalists who inflexibly and absolutely want to hold on to their fundamentalists' opposition, two Realpolitiker camps in the party. First there are those who want to collaborate with the SPD as fast as possible in order to come to power. Among those he includes such ideologically diverse groups as the conservatives around Winfried Kretschmann in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the Berlin Greens around Ernst Hoplitschek, whom he also includes in the conservative wing, The Frankfurt "Spontis" around Joschka Fischer and various other groups without a clear and specific criticism of the system.

Trampert is likely also to include the majority of the Hessian Greens, as it voted for a deal with the Boerner government. Karl Kerschgens, for instance, who led the Greens in their negotiations in Wiesbaden, to the national executive spokesman is one who "wants to administer the state."

In the other Realpolitiker group the man from Hamburg includes himself (and the Greens of Hamburg, of course), parts of the Bundestag parliamentary group and strong groups in the various Land chapters. That group did not generally aim at preventing cooperation with the SPD. Of course, one should have to negotiate with the SPD when the situation arises but be clear about one's own positions, especially about the "breaking points for negotiations."

Like Trampert, the Green Bundestag deputies Juergen Reents and Eckart Stratmann are accusing their Hessian friends that they had precisely not done so and had thus betrayed the green identity. Stratmann thinks the resolution of Usingen was a catastrophe. Thereby one had, in Hessen, "substantively and formally abandoned the radical claim." Yet it is not only the fear of having lost the radical claim that has the critics spinning.

Petra Kelly is afraid of "loss of identity through too much proximity to the SPD." Says she: "I shall not throw myself into the SPD's open arms." Some day the Social Democrats are going to come--she hopes--and pay the Greens' asking price. Till then the SPD would still have to change a lot, to be sure. But even she, the figurehead of the fundamentalists and moralists among the Greens, grants that none but the SPD is a conceivable political partner for the Greens.

Much like Petra Kelly, her parliamentary group colleague Juergen Reents of Hamburg looks at the matter--even if for different reasons. To him, the Greens are politically "not yet in the position to enter into coalitions." Moreover, the Greens had lined up "to restore the political opposition." That was their actual task for the time being. The Greens could, of course, support minority governments as long as they did not oppose central concerns of the Greens such as in the ecology or the peace policy. Such support should be given from case to case, however, and not in the form of a contractual tie. Like Beckmann, Reents is afraid the party could "grow too fast into the party system."

The dispute between those who, as Trampert says, "want to turn the Greens into a bourgeois party" and those who want to turn the social and political system of the FRG around in principle will lead to a tough clarification process this year. Those in Hamburg and their adherents in the other Land chapters intend to present a strategic program paper to finally clarify the what and wherefore of the Greens, possibly already at the European Congress in March, at the latest, at the Greens' national congress in fall.

There, more emphasis is to be given to the elements of social and economic criticism than has been the case in the general program papers of the Greens. Then they may perhaps get what, according to Bundestag deputy Stratmann of Bochum, the Greens still have not got: "An articulate position on social policy."

Also the very practical question of rotation in the party and the parliaments will come up. Crisscrossing all camps, one can hardly find any longer anyone who wants to stick with rotation in the form decided on. No one wants to abolish it completely either, though. As Schily has said: "Rotation--yes; but not the principle." A change, thus, is coming, perhaps still this year. Apart from a shared criticism of the human and political consequences of the brief 2-year term rotation, the various groups are pressed by highly diverse motives. Those who are for a close cooperation with the SPD soon point to the need for political and personnel continuity; that, they think, is a prerequisite for cooperation.

Precisely that, however, Rainer Trampert wants to prevent. A policy veering toward coalition--his analysis says--simply should have to "abolish basic democratic elements" for the sake of its coalition capability. Precisely because

of that, that man from Hamburg considers rotation "basically correct and tremendously important." About the rotational interval he is perfectly willing to listen to what others have to say, as long as the element itself is maintained.

5885

CSO: 3620/175



## BAVARIA PUSHES HARD LINE ON RESIDENT FOREIGNERS

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 26 Jan 84 p 18

[Article by Egon Scotland: "Family Reunification under the Strictest Rules in Bavaria--Hillermeier Does not Preclude Relaxation"]

[Text] Munich--The Bavarian government seems not to intend to hold on at all cost to its hard policy line on foreigners. Interior Minister Karl Hillermeiern in the law commission of the Landtag on Wednesday, intimated the rules about letting married people join their spouses--which are stricter right now in the Free State than in most other federal states--might possibly again be changed. The Minister ruled out giving information on the background of controversial cases of political activity by foreigners at a public session.

Second generation foreigners in the FRG may let their spouses come in to join them only if they themselves have resided for at least 8 years on federal territory. Only in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg the authorities furthermore insist the marriage must have been in effect for at least 3 years. SPD deputy Rolf Langenberger reacted to Hillermeier's backing that rule by the bitter remark that 3 years were notably the very same interval German divorce law had set before a marriage is considered to have gone to pieces. Langenberger's party group colleague, Carmen Koenig, also vexed Hillermeier, who is a member of the synod of the Evangelical Land Church, by placing in doubt the Christian character of such rules. The Basic Law precept of granting special official protection to marriages and families did not apply to Germans only but was an elemental human right.

In a report to the commission, on topical problems in the law on foreigners, Hillermeier had classified the special Bavarian constraints on family reunification as highly necessary. All other Laender, with the exception of Baden-Wuerttemberg, now only demand the marriage must have been in effect for one year before the partner may come in. At the end of the more than 3-hour debate in the commission, Hillermeier said the visiting right of marital partners was being handled generously. Furthermore, the 3-year term accorded with the view of the Bavarian government, "and I am not authorized to deviate from it." In spite of that he intimated he himself could not see why that would have to remain "a sacred cow for all times." Bavaria's foreigners quota, at 6.27 percent, lies below the federal average of 7.35 percent.

Guenther Beckstein (CSU) estimated a total of 6 to 7 million Turks joining their marital partners in case of total freedom of movement in the European Community as of 1 January 1986. As no lawyer could no longer find out by simply looking into the foreigners law what was what for any given group of persons, a new law with clear provisions was absolutely needed. Like Hillermeier, Beckstein deplored that the actual foreigners law, developed through official practice and court rulings, was split by numerous guidelines and separate regulations.

In two unusually controversial matters concerning foreigners accused of political extremism by the security authorities, the minister of the interior refused to provide the law commission with any details. He promised, however, to provide more of their background at a non-public security commission session. On grounds of "persistent agitation on behalf of the DKP," the Land capital Munich turned down a residence permit for the Egyptian Magdi El-Gohary, who has resided in the FRG since 1960, been married to a German for 13 years, and meanwhile has a grown son. Nor had Gohary denied before the court his attending several evening events of residential area groups of the DKP in Schwabing, and he was supported by organizations the DKP was trying to make use of within the scope of its alliance policy. "Other assured and still more aggravating information exists, which for security reason could not be passed on to the court," Hillermeier asserted.

The district government of Middle Franconia had for security reasons turned down a citizenship for the Spanish trade unionist Aguirre, a member of the Nuernberg foreigners council for many years. "The assured information on which that ruling was based can, however, not be revealed for overriding reasons," Hillermeier declared also in this case, adding the remark that the federal lawmakers should also "check into" the political record of foreigners.

This made it futile for Langenberger to inquire whether what had been ascertained against Aguirre might possibly go back to the era of the Franco regime. Even though he did not deny integrity to the top personnel in FRG intelligence, he did consider its agents subject to blackmail, for which reason the results of their investigations could normally not be trusted. By alluding to the skepticism of CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauss about intelligence reports on the dismissed General Kiessling, Langenberger, without either response or contradiction from the CSU, ventured to say that he found himself in the best of company with his judgment.

5885

CSO: 3620/173



## STUTTGART SETS CURBS ON 'MARRIAGEABLE TURKS'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 26 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by Peter Henkel: "The Marriageable Turks, Most Urgent Problem"]

[Text] Stuttgart's minister of interior and justice, Heinz Eyrich (CDU), means to curb the influx of foreigners, mainly from Turkey, into the FRG by drastic constraints. That politician has now gone public with a proposal that comes down to generally forbidding Turks to join their spouses and to an alternative where foreigners must either opt for German citizenship or return to the country of which they are citizens.

Eyrich called the at present most urgent problem that now there were circa 600,000 Turks at "marriageable age" in the FRG, and if only one out of three were to fetch his spouse from Turkey and no curbs were issued for such family influx, more than one half million Turks would come in in the years ahead. That would cause indissoluble integration problems, the minister said, merely on account of the language deficiencies of these Turks, arriving in Germany not until they are adults. "Far-reaching curbs to marital reunification," from the vantage point of Baden-Wuerttemberg, also were unavoidable because there threatened an unacceptable increase in the proportion of foreigners among the total population.

The FRG simply had "an insane attraction in that region," Eyrich went on to say, and one would have to expect between 4 and 5 million Turks once the freedom of movement, already in effect in the European Community, were to be extended to Turkey in 1986. Yet the FRG was no "immigration country" and could not afford "constantly pushing off the problem of the proportion of foreigners." In the case of Turks who want to stay and live in Germany without embracing German culture and, hence, without applying for citizenship, one should have "to make sure that problem gets resolved some time."

Eyrich intimated the CDU might drop the idea of allowing only children up to the age of 6 from non-EC states to join their parents. In exchange, the FDP coalition partner, having thus far opposed the age limit, should have to agree to such considerable curbs for the coming in of marital partners. The first response to Eyrich's thrust from FDP circles was, however, very negative. The deputy Baden-Wuerttemberg Land chairman Hinrich Enderlein called it foolish and typical of the humanitarian empathy of the "Christian"-Democratic

Land government. Such provisions, furthermore, were unconstitutional and could thus not be enforced. Alluding to the coming Landtag elections, Enderlein referred to a "cheap emotionalization of the fears of certain population groups."

5885

CSO: 3620/173

## GREENS SUSTAIN TENTATIVE PARTY UNITY IN HESSEN

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Feb 84 p 4

[Article by D. Guratzsch: "No Green Split"]

[Text] Among the Hessian Greens, with whom Prime Minister Holger Boerner (SPD) plans to form a permanent alliance, the torturous process of identity and conscience testing has by no means yet been concluded. The "radical ecologists" ("Radecs") and fundamentalists in the party keep looking with skepticism, concern and undisguised repugnance at the endeavors by the "Reformists" and "Realpolitiker" in the party to cooperate with Boerner. Yet they do not want to risk the unity of the Greens but fight for a change in course within the party. That was the outcome of the "Second Radicalecological Forum" bringing 150 Hessian Greens together on the weekend at Frankfurt's technical college.

That brought a grand display of conscience probing and helplessness. Up to a few months ago, the Radecs had things pretty well under control in Hessen. Then they could rely on a "massive movement" which, in opposing the western runway at Frankfurt airport, drew up to 150,000 people. Meanwhile, the influence of the "social movements," the citizens initiatives, opposing large-scale technical projects, has however rapidly waned. Completed, the runway is expected to be put into operation in April. In the runway communities, the Green city deputies have signed a cooperation accord with the SPD, preliminary to the approaching cooperation on the Land basis.

#### A Victory of the "Parliamentary" Forces

The power shift in the party showed up 3 weeks ago at the Land party congress in Usingen/Taunus. Two thirds of the 1,000 members who had come voted for going with the SPD. The Radecs and their friends of the Greens' federal executive quit the spot as vanquished. The Hessian Land association also interpreted that decision as a victory by the "parliamentary" forces over the so-called "Z Faction," which split off from the Communist League and succeeded in infiltrating the Greens' federal executive. That group is rumored to seek the old objective of changing the society under a green cloak. In contrast to the green "Reformists," whose social models are committed to the ideals of liberalization and decentralization, they are devoted to the model of a centralistic political and economic structure of old socialist coinage.

## The Citizen Initiatives' Muscular Atrophy

The irritants expressed in this intra-party dispute abounded on the weekend at Frankfurt's technical college. The fundamentalists referred to a "crisis" and to their party's being in a "shitty situation." There was endless lament about the citizen initiatives' muscular atrophy, which the Radecs continue to hold up as the "leg the Greens stand on." It often sounded like a litany on the good old times of struggle irrevocably past, such as one from Wiesbaden saying: "I would like to work with citizens initiatives once again as I did 3 years ago. But I know not a single one of them in Wiesbaden in which I would like to be involved." It matched the "nostalgic" accents of the meeting that for once not the young Greens, but those between 30 and 50 years of age, set the tone.

Jan Kuhnert of the Green Landtag group formulated the survival strategy. Neither quitting nor splitting the party could achieve the goal of "radical social change toward an ecological and humane society." The smirking victor would only be the "capitalist growth society," and the splintered Greens "could at best weave flowers into the chains tying the people to the vehicle that is racing ahead to the annihilation of the world." That is why the Radecs should hold their positions among the Greens, remain open-minded to the basic initiatives, criticize the "false course" and recruit majorities in the meetings of the Greens.

5885

CSO: 3620/174

## COMMUNIST LEAGUE PENETRATION OF GREENS DETAILED

Bonn DIE WELT in German 27 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Detlef Ahlers: "The Trouble with Being a Green Communist"]

[Text] "Forces are pushing forward in the party now that are changing the policy of the Greens in a no longer acceptable manner," such criticism came from the Greens' Bundestag deputy, retired General Gert Bastian. He meant mainly "the former Z faction coming out of the Communist League," which is "violence-oriented and strongly anti-American."

That Z faction includes Rainer Trampert, member of the National Executive Committee; Juergen Reents, Bundestag member; Thomas Ebermann (CL alias Langer), member of the Hamburg citizenry; Michael Stamm, who sits in the Hamburg Land executive committee; and Bettina Hoeltje and Marion Pein, who are supposed to move up into the citizenry.

In 1979 the middle level of the CL (center faction) departed from the executive. The League lost many members; membership rapidly shrank from some 2,300 to 1,200. It is active mainly in North Germany, with headquarters in Hamburg and branches in Berlin, Goettingen and Freiburg. Its position during Maoism was on the side of Mao's widow, against the "Hua Putsch."

The splitters' criticism of the executive was due to differences of opinion on whether a communist organization (such as the CL) gets into a crisis through external or internal influences and on how one should, therefore, assess at that time the founding of a Greens party. Prior to that uproar the CL had been the last communist group intact (except for the VEB DKP) and the only one that ever could send a respectable number of workers and unemployed onto the streets.

Circa 150 Z adherents decided to quit the CL and try the Greens. In the November 1979 "Arbeitskampf" [Labor Campaign] 166, they expressed why they had taken that step: the Greens, to be sure, were not identical with the "new party" the CL analysis had predicted, but the green movements were in danger "to become easy prey to bourgeois reintegration maneuvers," which should have to be prevented by having communists getting involved--regardless of the spontaneous up and down of such movements. "The concentration of left-wing currents at bourgeois elections was a political weakness, parliamentary illusion," to be sure, but should have to be regarded as "inevitable over the short haul."

Approximately 30 months after the split, the group supplied additional reasons (as to TAGESZEITUNG of 10 August 1982): Lenin had believed the revolution in the production relations would facilitate an unbridled development of the productive forces. That image of progress resembled that of Struass in overlooking the destructive aspect of industrial production. The Z people were rough on the C groups: "They are preaching the theory of liberation to gather disciples."

None of these position papers--each as long as an EC agrarian decree--mentions one motive considered decisive by many young people. From the start, the CL had sought to penetrate the Greens. That turned out to be a mistake, for many CL members learned from the Greens that there are "forms of political coalition shaped by confidence, not by hidden contempt," as DIE ZEIT put it.

Criticism such as Bastian's could often be heard in the Greens' Hamburg Land association, which is the one most penetrated by the Z people. Yet critics also admitted the Z people were in important positions because they did not mind handling the more tedious things such as bookkeeping, telephone service, or summarizing meter-long theses papers by giving them manageable compromise proportions. They furthermore were skilled in organization, had contacts with printing shops and so forth.

One pithy comment was all that Ebermann of Hamburg thought Bastian's criticism was worth: "Whether one finds worse that someone used to be a general or a Leninist is a matter of taste. All Z people were elected for their functions by the constituency--there was no putsch. Meanwhile I think parliamentary work is meaningful, but I also think too much is made of the opposition's opportunities at leisure hours."

If it were up to the Z group, Hessian Greens should have to tolerate the SPD minority government but should not accept a coalition government. And still the Hessian Greens are being attacked because "they only wrested from Boerner what he was going to do anyway" (Ebermann)--which had thus rendered the Greens superfluous.

5885

CSO: 3620/174



NATIONAL COUNCIL RAPS GREEN/SPD LINK IN HESSEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 23 Jan 84 p 4

[Newsreport: "Greens Against Hessen Greens"]

[Text] The Greens' National Council (BHA) disapproved the cooperation with the SPD the Hessian Greens decided on last weekend. In all negotiations with Hessen the positions of the Greens had not been advocated "resolutely enough," so says the pronouncement ratified by a clear majority, after a fierce discussion, by the circa 60 National Council members in Kaiserslautern last weekend. The outcome of the negotiations, the delegates thought, was no "acceptable compromise" between the policy of the Greens and of the SPD.

The National Council--the Greens' highest party organization between party congresses--thereby followed a resolution by the National Executive Committee which had criticized the negotiations last weekend, even prior to the crucial Hessian Land assembly. Executive Committee spokesman Rainer Trampert said the Greens, who had come in as "radical opponents to the system," should not now become "administrators" of that system. Such a development the party could not survive.

5885

CSO: 3620/174

## LOWER SAXONY GREENS SHIFT STANCE ON 'ROTATION'

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 10 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Hans-Peter Sattler: "In Hannover, One Does Not Care to Talk of Rotation Anymore"]

[Text] Lower Saxony's Greens delegates do not have to worry unduly about rotation after all because the young party, which before the spring 1982 elections had promised the amazed electorate it would recall its deputies in the middle of the 4-year election period and replace them by novices, in the meantime got a different idea. No longer all of them, but still only at least five of the eleven deputies in Hannover's Leine Castle are to lay down their mandates in the summer and make room for their ballot successors, stamping around excitedly for weeks already.

The new decision, which the Greens at once celebrated as a kind of model at their most recent Land delegates conference in Hildesheim, and which should be emulated by other Land associations, is of course a laborious compromise. It had been clear to the party for some time that it would get mighty shaky if it tried to rotate as planned. There have long been people in the small Landtag party group who, with furrowed brows and anxious voices, have been citing constitutional law. Unfortunately, so they say, it provided the deputies with privilege by unalterably setting down they were responsible only to their conscience and not bound by instructions or assignments. In clear-text: they need not give a farthing for what their electorate might impose on or demand of them.

## Successors Crowding In

Green Landtag members found the old rotation resolution hard to swallow after getting somewhat used to parliamentary life. Of the ample monetary allowances the deputies turned over everything to an ecological fund, except for a skilled worker's salary of M 2,000 and child support of M 450 per child, per diem, travel and overnight lodging expenses, to be sure, but one may presumably find it less enticing to give up such pleasant work in Hannover only to teach again in some school. Someone else finds it less pleasant still to drop back into unemployment. And a third one, finally, explicitly conceived of her new life as a parliamentarian as a chance for her own emancipation which she should not, for the sake of all other green women alone, surrender after only 2 years.

No wonder it took long for the party group to notice the urgings from the famous electorate and the noisy reminders from the presumed successors. Shortly before Christmas the eleven agreed to make an offer to the Land delegates conference: If not each one of them were to be discussed individually, six deputies would be willing to quit the Landtag and forgo the chance to request an extension of their parliamentary mandate from the delegates.

#### Renouncing Solidarity

One day later, a seventh deputy, because he would not violate solidarity and step out of ranks, joined them, while for the other four it was clear anyway they should (or absolutely would) stay. At the delegates conference in an unheated youth hostel in the bishopric of Hildesheim, it became clear fairly fast, however, that too much store could not be placed in that offer because the then head of the party group blithely announced that among the seven there also were some who had announced against rotation.

One of them, Martin Mombaur of Luechow-Dannenberg, is for rotation, to be sure, but he also knows that his constituency would never let him quit his mandate, which is quite reassuring to him. His party group colleague Manfred Meinsen also is for rotation, to be sure, but not after only 2 years. He even intimated he might quit the party group and the party if wrong decisions were taken in this respect. The seventh, finally, who did not want to hurt solidarity, has meanwhile even been asked by the whole party group, from a sense of social and fellow-human solicitude, to take back his offer to resign his mandate. So you see, even among the Greens, of which some confuse Landtag work with group therapy, things are not as black as they look.

Anyone who said, in that cold youth hostel, the party was sort of cheating its voters by not recalling its deputies would fairly much stand alone. He would have to endure the exclamation of disapproval that it could not really mean cheating the voters if one had got smarter meanwhile.

Another speaker stood alone in Hildesheim, who dismissed the remark from Neddermeyer and his colleagues, that the stability and working capability of the party group should have to be maintained even after the rotation, as plain nonsense that could not and should not make any difference to the rotation principle. He presumably did not know that the compromise resolution, later adopted by a downright overwhelming majority and enthusiastically applauded, had at that point already been figured out.

#### Controversy over the Correct Course

This had happened in long preliminary talks between the party group members and the important district associations, where the argument carried that even the Greens could not do without ensuring continuity in parliament. While those deputies that were supposed to stay in the Landtag kept eloquently mute during the nearly 3-hour debate, their colleagues mostly talked like people already more or less established in the political business.

Only two of them swam a bit against the current, against the grand consensus: Rudolf Groesch, elected counsellor in Clausthal, who said Greens could do good work, not only in the Landtag, and Frierich Haubold, who invoked the "gigantic risk" of becoming exactly like all other parties if the Greens kept their deputies in parliament. It still has to be put to the test, to be sure, which is, at all that, not likely to come before summer.

5885

CSO: 3620/174

## FRICTIONS BEGIN TO APPEAR IN GOVERNING COALITION

## Center, Rural Parties Mutually Irritated

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Jan 84 p 6

[Article by Janne Virkkunen: "Smooth Collaboration Has Lasted 8 Months: Problems Ahead for Government"]

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's four-party majority government, which has reached 8 months of age, has ruled the country in surprisingly good harmony, although the old-timers SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party], KEPU [Center Party] and RKP [Swedish People's Party] have been joined by a newcomer, the SMP [Finnish Rural Party].

Big issues are, however, beginning to pile up on the government table, issues which might bring up the temperature of the domestic politics and which might even cause the government to creak in its joints.

The Center Party has for the past few weeks felt uncomfortable in the government. Chairman Paavo Vayrynen has in the Center Party's main newspaper, SUOMENMAA, expressed his irritation with the role of the Rural Party.

According to Vayrynen SMP has not taken a stand in the big basic governmental decisions. The center would indeed wish to have the SMP as a faithful ally to KEPU and the RKP to counterbalance the Social Democrats lead by Sorsa.

SMP Chairman Pekka Vennamo replied, in his turn, in SUOMENMAA to Vayrynen that SMP is not an assistant party for KEPU. According to Vennamo SMP wishes to have negotiations with KEPU also in issues where KEPU and SDP have not in advance made agreements over the others' heads.

It is, on the other hand, advantageous for SDP that SMP is not closely allied with the rest of the center. Thus the majority of the government center remains invisible. That might also explain Sorsa's peaceful attitude to SMP's fickle work within the parliament.

## KEPU Brightens Up Its Image

The Center Party has already for a long time wanted to brighten up the profile of the center of the government, so that the fruits that result from the government collaboration would not turn out to be only a growth in the support of the Social Democrats and the SMP. Signs of this Center Party effort are also beginning to appear, although it is needless to talk about breaking up the government.

## Middle Parties Announce Cooperation

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Jan 84 p 9

[Unattributed article: KEPU, SMP and RKP Announce Their Common Government Demands: The Middle Groups Gather Their Ranks and Emphasize That They Form the Majority"]

[Excerpts] The middle parties of the government, KEPU, SMP and RKP emphasized on Wednesday that they form the majority in the government and announced their common goals as solutions to several central government problems. The leaders of the three middle groups announced at the same time that they had agreed to intensify the collaboration.

The middle groups published their common list of goals on Wednesday afternoon after the regular weekly meeting. Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen explained the background of the paper by saying that the government work has not proceeded as well as was originally intended.

"We are dissatisfied with the way the issues that are important to us have proceeded in the government," said Vayrynen and assured that it is not a matter of getting tired of collaborating with the Social Democrats. The center group has nine ministers in the government and SDP has eight ministers.

Both Vayrynen and RKP Chairman Par Stenback were of the opinion that the center's move clarifies the situation within the government.

According to Stenback the center's paper is a compromise decision. It was made surprisingly easily, which is a positive indication for the future collaboration. The RKP chairman says that the paper includes the most intricate issues of current interest.

The middle parties' joint list of demands inevitably involves SMP as a more definite part of the middle groups of the government. SMP Chairman Paavo Vayrynen's standpoint differed, however, slightly from those of Vayrynen and Stenback.

According to Pekka Vennamo the middle parties' list indicates that the middle parties are fed up with the level of the collaboration so far. Vennamo was also asked whether SMP will from now on be one of the middle groups.



Vennamo answered, like he did last spring, that SMP is a non-socialist bourgeois party.

According to Vennamo it is not possible to draw the conclusion from the paper that it would become the basis for the organizing of the middle group collaboration.

#### Support of Home Child Care Serious and Important

The list of demands of the middle parties was titled: "The Standpoint of the Nonsocialist Groups of the Government in Regard to Certain Government Policy Issues of Current Interest."

#### Nuclear Power Questioned

The center is not ready to accept the construction of any kind of large power plant for the production of electricity, before the other possibilities have been efficiently exploited. According to the middle parties the Parliament should be given the authority to make the decisions about the constructions of nuclear power plants.

The middle parties demand from the Environment Ministry that presentations be made, among other things, about how to improve the protection of air against acid rain. According to the middle parties the ministry should also hurry to purchase nature reserves at the costs required.

#### Astonishment Within the Social Democratic Party

The Social Democrats were carefully quiet about the middle parties' operation on Wednesday. The matter was before the SDP party committee first thing in the morning. The rapid clarification of the matter is made more difficult primarily by President Mauno Koivisto's trip to Spain, which began in the morning, and during which time the presidential duties are handled by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. Sorsa, however, is a part of the party committee.

On the other hand, Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen leaves for China and Indonesia on Friday, wherefrom he returns on Sunday next week.

Among the Social Democrats it was considered unparalleled that the government majority announces--without negotiating beforehand even with the prime minister--that it has established its standpoints in central issues.

The majority is entitled to carrying through its standpoints in the government and the minority then has the right to draw conclusions on the matters, SDP stated.

There was, on the other hand, astonishment in the SDP about the fact that the income negotiations were almost completely missing from the middle parties' paper and it is the total solution that the Social Democrats are committed to passing through for acceptance.

## Sorsa Attacks Bourgeois Alliance

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Jan 84 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Cabinet Dispute Between Middle Parties and SDP Continues: Sorsa Makes Accusation About Intentions To Change Government Program"]

[Excerpts] The open dispute within the cabinet between the center parties and the Social Democrats froze into an open disagreement on Thursday. Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa accused the center of efforts to change the government program.

Center Party Chairman, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen denied this and said that the list of goals that the three middle parties had published was the center's interpretation of the goals of the government program.

With the SDP support Sorsa linked the situation to the labor market negotiations. He considered it necessary to quickly explain what the government parties are ready to do for an income policy agreement. At the same time the labor market leaders were asking for information from the government about how it could participate in the income negotiations.

According to Sorsa SDP is ready for government program negotiations after Sunday of next week when Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen has returned from his trip to the Far East. Sorsa himself is out of the picture for a week handling the president's duties during President Mauno Koivisto's trip to the Canary Islands.

The Social Democratic party committee accused the government's middle party majority of attempts of making administrative decisions within the government and trying to transfer incomes to the wealthy.

### SDP, Nonsocialists Continue Struggle

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Jan 84 p 9

[Text] The list of demands published by the cabinet middle groups has created a dispute about the interpretation about whether the goal of the center is to change the government program.

According to Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa this is the case, but according to Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen it is not so.

Grounds can be found for both standpoints. The center's list of demands that involves nine points contains the same matters as the government program and it is thus based on the program.

The center's paper is, however, an interpretation which is brought so far from the contents of the program that it brings back the situation almost

to the same point where it was last spring and it thus reopens the discussions about the program.

The intention is that these discussions should be held about a week from now, when Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa has returned to his duties as the prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vayrynen has returned from his trip to Asia.

The center groups are presenting as their primary demand that the dispute about support of home child care should be resolved immediately. At the same time the center presents its own solution model which is partly based on needed acquisitions.

The government program promises to "further develop both daycare centers and family day care as well as to broaden and legally develop the support system for child care."

According to the center group child care expenses should be made partly tax deductible, while the government program generally speaks about tax solutions that would favor families with children.

In their energy demands the middle groups tighten their attitude toward a possible large power plant. The center does not accept the construction of any kind of power plant before other possibilities have been efficiently exploited. The center's demand, on the other hand, according to which the parliament should decide about a possible ordering of a nuclear power plant, is already included in the government program.

In order to support enterprise activities the center groups list specific demands about changing business taxation, increasing tax reliefs as well as easing agricultural and business taxation.

Like the government program the center groups put emphasis on securing the conditions for small and medium sized enterprises. The government program promises to work on the basis of the PKT [expansion unknown] commission without specifying matters in any greater details.

Now the center is demanding that starting funds should experimentally be paid to the unemployed who want to start businesses. The government promises to clarify the possibilities for doing this.

In the center's opinion the mid-level administration should be reorganized with a goal of achieving provincial autonomy on the basis of the current municipal league organization. In general the government program speaks about decentralizing the administration and ending the decentralized investments.

Concerning the housing policy the center demands that the lessor get such a return on his capital that it would be an incentive to maintaining rental housing. Furthermore, the center demands tax solutions which would promote first of all the willingness of the private citizens to own rental housing.

The government program emphasizes that the rental housing construction by the state should be continued and that measures should be taken to prevent the decrease in the privately owned rental housing and to increase the supply.

To reorganize the unemployment compensation system the center demands that all unemployed be included within the framework of a reasonable basic support. The non-socialist groups of the government do not approve of the way of correlating the unemployment compensation to the wage level which results in gross differences in the daily compensation amounts.

The government program promises a proposal on reorganizing the maintenance system for the duration of the unemployment. In addition, the possibilities of creating a basic maintenance system are promised to be specified.

The government demands that the Environment Ministry present a detailed plan to intensify the air protection. Clear and sufficiently tight standards for pollution discharge controls are demanded. The center is demanding special loan arrangement for necessary investments.

Other demands include measures for choosing and delimiting nature reserve areas. Necessary purchases are to be made quickly with recompensation. At the same time the center notes that in connection with the reorganization of the construction law it does not approve of any changes that interfere with the lives of the rural population.

9662

CSO: 3617/86

## ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PASOK-KKE COOPERATION

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 15 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by Giorgos Botsis]

[Text] The new phase in PASOK-KKE relations--that is, of the two leading forces in the area of the broad Left--is tending to be turned into a dominating element in domestic political developments.

It is already creating a journalistic uproar and is seriously concerning the other political forces (the statements just yesterday by ND leader Ev. Averof and Leon. Kyrkos from the KKE Interior leaders) due to three--sensational, really, and in a short period of time--events:

1. The open collaboration of the PASOK and KKE syndicalist factions at the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] congress and the formation of its "conjunctive" board.
2. The KKE Central Committee's open proposal for "cooperation of all the progressive forces" which "is becoming, in the current situation, a solution of national necessity."
3. The second meeting, within ten days, and long talk of the two parties' leaders, An. Papandreou and Khar. Florakis, with the main, if not exclusive, content being the exchange of opinions on precisely this cooperation.

The propagandistic noise about these events, and primarily the popular-front danger-mongering of the Right's press (with anachronistic cries about "secret agreements" by command of the Kremlin or modelled on the Sofoulis-Sklavainas agreement 50 years ago, which are deplored even by intellectuals from the "innovative" Right--see G. Loulis' article in MESIMVRINI, 9 January 1984), is sometimes clouding the atmosphere and hindering new elements, real disagreements, and the perspectives drawn as regards these somehow noteworthy developments from being noted and made known.

Neither the dialogue at the leadership level nor the KKE proposal for cooperation are, by themselves, new elements in the relations of the two parties since the 1981 electoral triumph brought PASOK to power. A common practice all this time, the dialogue in "mass organizations," every so often reached the leadership level--with the primary conversors being Akis Tsokhatzopoulos from the PASOK Executive Office



and Nikos Kaloudis from the KKE Politburo. The new element as concerns the dialogue is its apparent upgrading, with the more frequent private talks between Andreas Papandreou and Kharilaos Florakis.

KKE's proposal for cooperation is also not something new. It was already the fundamental orientation of its tactics, based on the decisions of its eleventh congress. But the Central Committee's present decision-proposal contains new positions and thinking at three points mainly: First, in the dramatic invocation of the "deep economic crisis which will be continued" and necessitates "solutions of national necessity"; second, in the specification of the dangers of a "conservative retraction of certain strata" to the benefit of the Right; and, third, in the emphasizing that, in order to secure the "country's progressive course" and to place a "barrier to the Right," "answers to the country's problems are required, based on the goals of change, on cooperation of all the progressive forces..." etc. This formulation has already allowed certain commentators from the "innovative" Left (Biweekly POLITIS, 13 January 1984) to make the interpretation that the KKE is adopting even now PASOK's pre-1981 policy and is projecting itself as "the only consistent force which could implement it"--and so "gather adherents from the wide spectrum of discontents from PASOK, those who are either adherents, or defectors or the expelled."

The really noteworthy new thing is the new phase of detente and cooperation in PASOK-KKE relations, relations which, in this 27 months, have had repeated ups and downs--from the idyllic, to some extent, cooperations to the open confrontation, clash and rupture.

On general lines: Up to the summer of 1983, KKE, striving to exercise constant pressure "from the left" on the government, so it would not retreat on its programmatic proclamations and, at the same time, concerned about expanding its supports in the mass area and increasing its electoral influence, followed--generally, but not in a straight line--a tactic of confrontation, sometimes dynamic, on government policy. Points of pressure and friction in 1983 were the income policy of "frugality," the negotiations and agreement on the U.S. bases (where, however, KKE's "campaign" was castrated by Moscow's continual praises for Andreas Papandreou's foreign policy) and the famous "Article Four" in the law on "socializations." Emersions in confrontation passed from the sharpest mutual attacks--often with serious characterizations--from the columns of EXORMISI and RIZOSPASTIS to a "show of fists" with the incitement of strikes by KKE. They then culminated in the dramatic clash in the Chamber during voting of "Article Four," when Mr. Florakis proposed elections to PASOK, in order to renew its "contract with the people." And the government answer was exceptionally tough (it ended with the exhortation to KKE "to stop dynamiting the nation's course"), but also challenging--when through the mouth of Menios Koutsogiorgas this exhortation was addressed to the KKE parliamentary group which, in its composition, paints a portrait of the (good or bad, but, at any rate) bloody course of the Greek Left from Akronavplia to the "Polytechnic."

The culmination of the clash was followed by detente--and later the gradual restoration of cooperation, with a very significant demonstration being the two parties' collaboration at the GSEE congress. This was preceded by a momentary "flirt" by PASOK with the "innovative" wing of the traditional Left and a corresponding "flirt" by KKE with the idea of pursuing a coalition, in the line of



confrontation to the government, of all the forces of the Left, except for PASOK, so that an alternative leftist proposal and perspective could be developed.

The detente in the two parties' relations came at a critical moment: When the government, in order to deal with the chaos in the capital from the strikes and the danger they would be extended, began hesitantly using the repressive machinery (with MAT [Riot Center Units] and the well-tried ruses of prefabricated judicial decisions) which probably could have caused a generalization of the social agitation. And when KKE became aware that in the "mass area" it was creating, conflict-ingly, uninvited alliances with forces of the Right and "its" strikes were being promoted persistently and sensationally by the rightist press.

A common denominator for the two parties to reconsider relations between them was the danger of feeding and strengthening the "revanchist" tendencies of the Right.

So we arrived at the new phase of the two parties' "mutually beneficial" cooperation and dialogue. For PASOK, this cooperation is exceptionally useful now because it literally covers its rear on the new axes of its policy, which are: First, to secure "social peace" in 1984--for which a necessary prerequisite is the economy's recovery, which would allow a more daring income and social policy in the election year 1985; and, second, for eventual adjustments for a more general political approval and responsibility on the great pending issues of our foreign policy (Cyprus, Greek-Turk issue, NATO, etc.). Furthermore, the boundaries of this cooperation and dialogue are predetermined: Widest in the social area (trade union movement, local self-administration, peace movement, cultural activities, etc.) and limited at the political level--so much so that KKE is not "made room for" in the political life. The strategy of "National Popular Unity" leaves no margins for "frontal" schemes, for partners in power and common programs.

For KKE, which is still tracing its steps ten years after its legalization, without the monumentalism of the past, this cooperation allows it to consolidate and widen its supports in the "mass area," to participate equally in the political dialogue, and to promote unifying works at the "base" with the hope that, slowly or swiftly, they will find their reverberation at the political level also. Its obvious aim is to stop functioning as an instigator of pressure and for its positions and forces to contribute to the development and radicalization of a mass movement which "will bar the road to the right" and will support the "alternative solution" for "real change." With the present correlation of forces, not even KKE is making a demand for participation in the government--for a "front." But in its dialogue with PASOK, in addition to the proposals for a "way out of the economic crisis," "fundamental democratization" and "national independence," it is raising for discussion, if not negotiation, the political problems connected to the reckonings which will mark political developments in the next two years (Euroelections, election of a president of the republic, general elections). And among these, the electoral system is probably not the most serious....

An equal (?) dialogue, therefore, and "mutually beneficial" cooperation (not imperturbable, on the other hand, as was shown in the strike of hospital doctors and clashes in OLME [Federation of Secondary School Teachers]) characterize the new phase of PASOK-KKE relations, which corresponds to the present correlation of forces.

The problem will be differentiated if this correlation of forces changes in the next general elections--that is, if PASOK, contrary to its expectations, does not secure a self-powered majority. But the possible cooperation of the two parties at a government level does not depend only on the correlation of forces and PASOK's insistence on implementing a "self-determined" program. A decisive role would be played by the stance of the president of the republic--and Kon. Karamanlis' negative position on the prospect of a "frontal" government scheme is a given. That is why the election of the president of the republic, after a year and a half, is a problem which logically would not remain on the outside in a promoted PASOK-KKE dialogue....

9247

CSO: 3521/169

## ANALYSIS OF PASOK'S 'ANTIDEMOCRATIC' MENTALITY

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 13-19 Jan 84 pp 8-9

[Article by N.D. Delipetros]

[Text] We said last week in this column that we are not so interested in when elections will occur as in how they will occur.

We maintained that the spirit of political intolerance and fanaticism reigning in the ranks of the government party is, in our opinion, making the smooth democratic course--for the present--dubious, at the least.

We also pointed out the systematic persecutions of the government's political adversaries and the efforts being made--through the notorious "branch committees"--to identify the government party with the state.

These are not good signs at all.

In our previous article, we were not at all occupied with one significant chapter of government policy which reveals what kind of antidemocratic wind is blowing in the ranks of PASOK: The electronic means of mass communication--television and radio--are being used more straightforwardly to conduct party propaganda.

This propaganda is expressed with constant praises of the government's work--with which it is assumed successful solutions have managed to be given to all the problems which have tormented the Greek people since the time of its liberation from the Turks.

The propaganda is also expressed with unacceptable attacks against the official opposition, attacks sometimes conducted with the recital of appalling libels which are written by the government's staff officers and sent to those in charge of television and radio so they can take care of broadcasting the offenses all over Greece....

The leader of the official opposition, Mr. Averof, who had dared to question the soundness of the government's foreign policy, has been characterized as "the last Greek entitled to speak about our national issues"!

And this improbable political vulgarity was broadcast, by order of the government, by all the radio and television news programs! There must have been no Greek not

informed of the government disclosure that the official opposition's leader is "nationally unworthy"!

How could one accept that the people who committed this shamelessness have any ideological relation whatsoever with democracy and the spirit of tolerance which characterizes democratic politicians--a spirit which obliges them to express respect toward viewpoints with which they disagree?

What democratic country's democratic government would dare to question the right held by the leader of the official opposition to judge and criticize the government's policy?

Democracies--true democracies--do not consider anyone an uncontrolled administrator of power. And it is well-known that those who pride themselves that they are God-given saviours and behave like owners of the state have no ideological relation with true democracy.

A commentator in the afternoon government newspaper, trying to justify the unjustifiable, attributed the insult against Mr. Averof to the government spokesman's "loquaciousness." But "loquacious words," when they are said, are recanted. They are spoken, not written. They do not become "loquacious" documents and official government announcements which are distributed to all the newspapers and sent to radio and television. The "loquacious" person has all the margins of time to somehow set things right and somehow curtail the evil. If he is a loquacious person of good faith....

But also, even those who are seized by paroxysms and stop being masters of their nerves, and are carried away to saying and writing things which do not become them, find, as soon as their rage passes, some excuse to recant. Unless they are never masters of their nerves when it would be good for them to relax.... Because it is very difficult for one to be a master who is not master of his nerves....

We hasten, however, to point out that the government spokesman--every government spokesman--is not speaking as an individual, but on behalf of the government which he represents. And the spokesman's antidemocratic air and character are declarative of the air and character of those represented....

From this viewpoint, it would be unjust for us to ascribe to the government spokesman or government spokesmen responsibilities greater than those which they have in reality. They are obedient dispatchers of the antidemocratic government line, but they are also collectively responsible--with the other ministers--for the antidemocratic spirit with which the government communications are imbued. Because there is "no unwilling minister." Yet how could we confine to the government spokesman, or other lower--in the government hierarchy--persons the responsibilities for the monstrous propaganda and antidemocratic air of the government communications, when we have ample proof that this spirit emanates directly from the top of the government?

Unfortunately, we are obliged to point out that the head of the government himself has maltreated the opposition--no longer as an instigator, but as a candid perpetrator.

We will confine ourselves to mentioning two leading aberrations of the head of the government. With a lack of hesitancy seldom encountered in democratic regimes, the leader of the government charged that officials from the opposition struggled abroad to thwart government efforts to strengthen the Greek economy. There was a second declaration of a similar quality by the head of the government--a statement which took a more specific form and was invested with numbers, probably to make it more believable. We will refer yet again to the famous 120 million dollars, which supposedly were collected in Chicago by officers of the official opposition or people who follow the instructions of the New Democracy party in order to sabotage the Greek economy.

These improbable, extravagant tales were presented by all the means of mass communication. And--up to this hour--there has been no attempt to retract these appalling accusations, despite the fact that Mr. Averof called them slanderous....

Come now to marvel at the level to which our country's public life has fallen according to the government's assertions--assertions which are being projected by the electronic means of mass communication and the pro-government press:

Our country employs a government which monopolizes on its own behalf the concern for the course of domestic and national issues! The official opposition is composed of nationally unworthy people who have taken charge of carrying on the criminal work of "sabotaging" the Greek economy!

Those who study history will, I suppose, remember that all dictators and candidate dictators have hurled analogous accusations against the oppositions in their countries....

All these could be considered unacceptable improprieties of a government which is corrupt, but is still democratic. But, unfortunately, there are several other statements which do not allow us to believe that democracy--true democracy--is completely secured for the future of this country.

PASOK's famous plan for a socialist constitution--which was written by the president of the movement himself--confines the possibility of laying claim to power to socialist parties only. Only those who show absolute respect towards the socialist constitution will be allowed to be politicians....

We might observe that at present a constitution is in force which has no relation to the plan authored by A. Papandreou. But the plan for the socialist constitution gives us an idea about the ideological credo and intentions of its author.

Also, the socialist constitution does not exist; it is a lifeless piece of paper, put aside (but not disavowed) for the present. A. Papandreou exists, however--in fact, he exists as president of the party which possesses the parliamentary majority. And his intentions and ideas frighten democratic citizens.

But the ideas which those governing have about democracy were proclaimed in the most revealing, but also the most infuriating, way on the evening of municipal elections. During the announcement of results, PASOK was going along with the "other democratic forces"--that is, with KKE.

It is to KKE's credit that it does not conceal its love for the dictatorship of the proletariat and its contempt for the western type of democracy.

But this here does not concern "other democratic forces," which play the game of democracy with all the ease afforded them by our democratic constitution. It concerns PASOK, which along with "the other democratic forces" represents the total of the democratic forces! And thus PASOK and "the other democratic forces" define the quality of the democratic ideal by which they are animated.

We will reiterate that the party which occupies the official opposition is historically entrusted with the obligation of organizing a struggle which will aim at ensuring the Republic's faultless operation. All true democrats, irregardless of disagreements they have in the social or economic sector, must join their efforts for a panhellenic democratic front to be formed which will protect democracy from the social-bogeymen democrats of PASOK and the "other democratic forces."

One final example which defines the quality of the "democracy" on behalf of which the present government is struggling--through television and radio: During the review of political events in 1983, the leader of the official opposition was mentioned once. And only to comment to the public that he was subject to a serious operation abroad.

9247

CSO: 3521/169



## INTERPARTY PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE OVER KYP'S STATUS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 Jan, 2, 3, 4 Feb 84

/27 Jan 84 p 27

/Text/ The transfer of the Central Intelligence Service /KYP/ under the jurisdiction of the premier is directly related to the reshuffling of the government, a fact which conceals other objectives. This was stated by the New Democracy parliamentary spokesman K. Stefanopoulos before the appropriate parliamentary committee during the debate on the bill.

Responding to the claims of Minister to the Premier Ap. Lazaris that the transfer of KYP was done because this agency is unrelated to the basic tasks of his ministry, Stefanopoulos said that "to our initial question we have to now add the burden of an unconvincing reply."

Lazaris argued further that the transfer under the premier's jurisdiction aims at developing this agency quickly and to modernize it because KYP is very important to our national security. He added: "In any event, KYP is a political agency which was always under the jurisdiction of the premier."

Speaking for the ND, Vas. Papageorgopoulos emphasized that "the impression is that the premier wants to create around him watertight compartments and to assume powers either because he does not trust his associates or for some other reason. All these raise questions, especially in view of the fact that we are going toward an election and that Koutsogiorgas, who was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, wanted to take KYP with him."

ND Deputy Sapsalis said the bill is constitutionally irregular, politically unacceptable and legally groundless. "Who will be the KYP chief? A politician or an officer as provided by the existing law?"

Finally, Ap. Lazaris, replying to the fears expressed by the opposition that the personnel will be persecuted, gave assurances that no one would be touched.

KKE

KKE Deputy K. Kappos called unacceptable the regime prevailing in KYP under

the juntist law 38D/69 and the Legislative Decree 75/74. "Both", he said, "provide for the surveillance of the agents of international communism." Kappos said that KKE opposes the bill and "accepts KYP only as a counter-intelligence agency under the direct control of the Chamber of Deputies."

/2 Feb 84 pp 1, 3

/Text/ The government's insistence on extracting from the Chamber of Deputies "a blank check" so the premier will be able to control "at will and forever" all the KYP matters is without precedent. KYP is one of the most sensitive agencies. This was noted yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies by the opposition (ND and KKE) during the discussion of the bill "for placing KYP under the premier." ND and KKE stated they will vote against the bill, having basic objections which have different origins for each party.

The ND spokesmen emphasized that it is not accidental that all centers of control are passing into fewer and fewer hands as shown by the government's intention to unify the security corps and to place KYP directly under the premier. They added that the governing party needs "control mechanisms" and KYP may prove useful in this.

KKE argued that KYP has been involved in all "the political irregularities of the past" and emphasized that placing KYP under the premier does not guarantee that the present situation will change and the watertight compartments will disappear. For this reason, he called for a law that would describe specifically and analytically the KYP objectives and to place KYP under an all-party parliamentary committee.

Ap. Lazaris

The Minister to the Premier Ap. Lazaris, following KKE's reaction during the committee discussion of the KYP bill, and also after "behind-the-scenes" pressures from the Communist Party, introduced an amendment to the original text to abolish the provision which identified as one of the KYP objectives "the surveillance of the agents of international communism, to the extent their activities are directed against national security and the constitutional system."

It must be noted that this clause was enacted by the junta and had been repeated in a legislative decree by the government of National Unity and remained in effect.

The "Most Sound" Measure

PASOK spokesman Iosif Mikhelogiannis argued that placing KYP under the premier is "the most sound, most just, and most honest measure" because in this way he will be directly informed without the intervention of other persons. He assured the Chamber of Deputies that "the KYP personnel will not be touched and that the military experts will not be removed." Finally, he said, KYP will

deal with its main duties--counter-intelligence and intelligence for national defense and security.

#### Superpowers

The spokesman for the opposition Vas. Papageorgopoulos emphasized that "by placing KYP under the premier, his superpowers are expanding since he will now decide at will and forever on all matters of a very sensitive agency. This is specifically prohibited by the constitution (Art. 43)." He called the action as one more "typical case of personal government" and added that "in practice KYP will be headless and without real supervision since the premier keeps the Ministry of Defense and has stated that he will also take over the state administration and the economy! As a result, they already talk about the name of the next real director of KYP who will naturally be a party man."

Finally, Papageorgopoulos emphasized that in spite of all the changes in agencies, branches and employees, none of the KYP representatives was asked. "Is this the way PASOK honors the syndicalism?"

#### All-Party Control

Maria Damanaki (KKE) stated that her party will vote against the bill because "even after the introduction of certain amendments we see no real change in the unacceptable regime in KYP. It is penetrated through and through by foreign secret services, American and NATO, and totally oriented because of its past, not to the service of the country's real interests, but to the surveillance of the progressive forces (especially KKE)." Madame Damanaki proposed that a special all-party committee be established to control the activities and the performance of KYP.

#### The Files

The independent Socialist Deputy St. Panagoulis caused a sensation with his speech and the statement/wager that "he will resign from his seat in parliament if his personal file in KYP has not grown three times in volume since 18 October 1981." Panagoulis also said that KYP has only 1,200 employees officially registered in its employ but tens of thousands of prostitutes, ordinary crooks, convicts, and other trash which it uses as stool pigeons create files on political persons. He mentioned cases of specific persons who had files in KYP.

He added that his file contains all the social visits he made to ministers of the present government after his resignation as deputy minister of interior and he asked that "KYP stop its stool pigeon activities." He said the Greek embassies abroad have more agents than regular employees and concluded with the prediction that "now KYP will get files for the rest of the Greeks it had not on file already."

The debate continued into the night. The same bill includes a provision for abolishing the two posts for deputy ministers in the Ministry of Agriculture and establishes two posts for associate ministers of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture.

#### Intervention

The controversy over the decision to place KYP under the premier "is somewhat excessive and disorienting," said the Minister to the Premier Ap. Lazaris. He added that the objective of the bill is to reform and modernize KYP so it can meet the national needs.

The minister said that the placing of KYP under the premier was the best solution because this will relieve the minister to the premier from several dissimilar tasks and let him concentrate undisturbed on planning issues of the administration. He added that an initial thought to place KYP under the Ministry of Defense was rejected because it would cause "organizational confusion."

Ap. Lazaris claimed that the transfer of KYP from the Ministry to the Premier had been decided for some time now and should not be connected with the recent reshuffling. Following the reshuffling there were press reports that the conservative wing of PASOK did not trust the present minister to the premier because he is an unrepentant Marxist and for this reason was deprived of jurisdiction over the secret services.

The minister also said it is not true that he himself asked that KYP be removed from the ministry when he assumed the post. He admitted, however, that "at an unrelated moment" he expressed the view that KYP should be removed from the Ministry to the Premier.

#### K. Stefanopoulos

Replying to the minister to the premier, the parliamentary spokesman of ND K. Stefanopoulos criticized the government for not giving a convincing explanation for the transfer of KYP under the jurisdiction of the premier. "My explanation was that there were strange things happening there and you didn't dare admit them." He emphasized that within a short period of time the government changed the basic law which regulates the composition, functions and effectiveness of the ministerial council, a fact which testifies to the haphazard nature of its decisions.

At another point, Stefanopoulos, referring to the Panagoulis charges, admitted that KYP conducted the surveillance of political persons. "We do not hesitate to admit this because we believe in this way KYP is doing its job. How do you think a government official was caught in Norway for espionage? You did--you were right--and you know you were right."

Stefanopoulos finally assured the Chamber of Deputies that when ND came to

power in 1975 it ordered KYP to stop any cooperation with foreign secret services. He said this in reply to those who talked about "dependence and penetration" and underlined that during the ND government KYP was focused on the national issues and at no time did it engage in the surveillance of citizens because of their ideological beliefs.

/3 Feb 84 pp 1, 3

/Text/ Since the day after the fall of the junta, no order was given to KYP for the surveillance of political parties, political persons or other citizens according to the records of the agency which were searched by Minister A. Koutsogiorgas. This assurance was given by the minister of interior who actually repeated it three times. A. Koutsogiorgas also confirmed what was said two days ago at the Chamber of Deputies by the ND parliamentary spokesman K. Stefanopoulos--during the debate on the bill for the transfer of KYP to the premier. Stefanopoulos said that since 1974 KYP stopped any cooperation with foreign secret services.

By contrast, the independent Socialist Deputy St. Panagoulis claimed that A. Koutsogiorgas had not told the truth and charged that: "The minister of interior and former minister to the premier is accustomed to fabricate files, to engage in intrigues and conspiracies against the fighters. I accuse him tonight of being the chief manufacturer of the file against the fighter Andreas Khristodoulidis (who was removed from the Executive Bureau of PASOK)."

Stathis Panagoulis attacked Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas for saying that in his speech two days ago Panagoulis gave information about the KYP which was "groundless and untrue."

Minister Koutsogiorgas spoke yesterday about the KYP in his former capacity as its political superior. The Koutsogiorgas speech was prompted by yesterday's speech by KKE parliamentary spokesman Nik. Kaloudis who read "information bulletins" by KYP, referring to the activities of Communist party members.

K. Stefanopoulos

ND parliamentary spokesman K. Stefanopoulos accused Kaloudis of bringing to the Chamber of Deputies "documents" whose authenticity cannot be proven and which could be written by anyone. He gave assurances for a second time that since 1974 no surveillance of political persons or other citizens has taken place.

Stefanopoulos further argued that if the "secret documents" read by Kaloudis to the Chamber are real then "we must assume that KKE has infiltrated KYP."

"The Panagoulis File"

Interior Minister Koutsogiorgas admitted in his speech that "KYP is an agency



which has made a contribution to the nation and has a valuable mission to perform for the national security." He denied the charges of independent deputy S. Panagoulis that KYP uses prostitutes and criminals as agents and reiterated that there is no Panagoulis file in the KYP records because such a file had been destroyed during the ND government. He presented a document verifying that this happened on 12 October 1981.

The discussion continued until late and Minister Koutsogiorgas did not reply to the Panagoulis charges.

Coming back to the personal issue, Panagoulis accused Koutsogiorgas that the document about the destruction of his file was manufactured "this morning" in KYP.

"I have in my hands," he said, "my file as it was one month before I resigned as deputy minister of interior."

In his reply Koutsogiorgas denied that he insulted Panagoulis and, in a mild manner, stated that he respects the struggles of Panagoulis and of the Panagoulis family. "The document on the destruction of your file is signed by KYP officials who are no longer in the agency. If you think it is a fake then take it to the public prosecutor."

Speaking on the Khristodoulidis issue, he said that /Panagoulis/ in no way can prove that he or KYP were involved in manufacturing the Khristodoulidis file. He attributed the issue "to certain forces which wanted to create the impression that there was a Khristodoulidis case within PASOK."

He added that nothing was proven against Khristodoulidis and that, on the contrary, the PASOK Executive Bureau stated that Khristodoulidis "has the confidence of the party."

/4 Feb 84 p 77

/Text/ Independent Deputy Stathis Panagoulis said that he is not satisfied with the explanations given by Interior Minister Koutsogiorgas to the Chamber of Deputies concerning the KYP activities. Koutsogiorgas was the political superior of KYP prior to the reshuffle when he was minister to the premier. In a statement yesterday Panagoulis characterized as fake the document Koutsogiorgas brought Thursday night, claiming that it was the affidavit of the destruction of Panagoulis' file.

Koutsogiorgas had stated that since the fall of the junta in 1974 KYP had not received any orders to keep political persons under surveillance. He rejected as "foolish" what was said on Wednesday evening even by government deputies in the Chamber concerning suspect activities of KYP. However, Koutsogiorgas said he agreed with the statement of the present Minister to the Premier Ap. Lazaris who said that at one time KYP "was synonymous with conspiracy." At this point in the Koutsogiorgas speech, Lazaris pointedly left the Chamber



and returned only after Koutsogiorgas had finished his speech. Then he speeded up the discussion on the bill.

#### The Panagoulis Statement

In his statement Panagoulis says: "Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, during the debate on the KYP activities in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, invoked a certain 'affidavit of destruction' of my file kept by KYP. Instead of an affidavit--even a fake one but one that would look like an official document--he brought a 'piece of trash' without names, with scattered figures, words and dates.

"This so-called affidavit obviously does not refer to me--does not refer to anyone--and it is hard to understand why the former political superior of KYP gambles his personal seriousness and trustworthiness on invoking silly documents.

"Of course, the PASOK equilibrium which was upset after the last reshuffling explains a great deal but not everything. Respect for truth requires a different course. It calls for the immediate creation of an all-party committee of deputies to investigate in depth the suspect political activities of KYP up to this moment and to establish responsibilities where they exist, even for national tragedies this country has suffered. It is evident that Koutsogiorgas yesterday tried to deceive the Chamber of Deputies."

In his speech Koutsogiorgas also said that the destruction of the Panagoulis file took place on 10 October 1981, that is, 6 days before the election.

7520

CS0: 3521/170

## PUJOL REVEALS CIU ECONOMIC, SOCIAL PLATFORM

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 28 Jan 84 p 9

[Article by J. Andreu]

[Text] Barcelona--Tomorrow Convergence and Union [CIU] will present its electoral program in a function which will be held at Montjuic with the presence of the national conference of the coalition. The day will be used for the various powerful organs of Convergence and Union to examine the preliminary program which a numerous team of experts has prepared under the direction of Miquel Roca, the head of the campaign and secretary general of the Convergence delegation.

Jordi Pujol, the Convergence candidate and current president of the Generalitat, has kept to himself the presentation of the political part in the strict sense, of which no preliminary document has been released. Instead, a summary of the rest of the program has been prepared to which AVUI has had access and which constitutes the rough draft of the program that will be presented tomorrow. In short, it may be said that it is not simply a continuing program, but tries to accomplish more of the government work performed during these four years of government by CIU, along the lines of progress and social welfare.

The document to which our newspaper has had access has 13 large sections plus an appendix devoted to the territorial organization of Catalonia.

#### Economic Policy

As far as economic policy is concerned and starting with "a moderate optimism," "despite the delay in reactivation measures" on the part of the central government, the program of the nationalist coalition speaks of the following basic steps: revitalization of the Catalan Credit Institute, implementation of a policy of research and technical modernization, action on transportation infrastructures and struggle against territorial inequalities, promotion of investment. In the sphere of industrial policy, actions are centered on the participation in the processes of industrial reconversion and the promotion of high technology industrial activities.

Within the sectorial economic policy, CIU believes that Catalonia must make a serious effort at energy planning with participation in the national energy plan. Within tourist policy, it asks for promulgation of a general tourist law, while where domestic trade is concerned, the policy to be developed includes the planning process which is also needed in the agrarian sector, with stimulation of private resources.

### Fight Against Unemployment

The chapter of the fight against unemployment starts with a triple assumption: it is the most serious problem; the socialist government has not been able to do anything about it; and the resources of the government are limited. From now on, the program of the current party in power asks for harmonious development of the private sector and for public investment to be directed towards stimulation of the general economic activity, not only towards the creation of jobs.

The great milestones of the territorial policy go beyond territorial rebalancing, urban renewal, the enforcement of existing environmental laws and implementing the highway plan already presented to the Parliament. Water policy is a more complex problem, and to avoid any confusion of legal authority, a provisional agreement with the ministry is requested until the transfer of legal authority takes place. The rest of the program concerning this section or article falls into the lines already followed by the council so far.

"There is no need to make citizens identical, but to create an equality of opportunities that will make possible the development in freedom of the capabilities of each. This is what the program says when it speaks of teaching, the objectives of which are: freedom of choice, pedagogical quality, devotion to Catalonia and permanent development."

The cultural program starts from the national Catalan fact and the premise that the culture "is a creative activity incompatible with ideological impositions or exclusions." The objectives would be: creation of its own cultural infrastructure, dissemination of culture as the sign of social welfare, strengthening of the social and cultural fabric, achievement of full linguistic equality, effective cultural decentralization, opening of our culture towards the outside world, protection of the cultural industry and use of new techniques within the cultural field, the CIU rejects what it brands as government-controlled culture and speaks of fostering private initiative.

Finally the document points out that "linguistic normalization is the biggest cultural challenge in today's Catalonia," and proposes that a greater implementation of the law of normalization be carried out.

Regarding youth, CIU proposes making a youth policy whereby the problems of youth will be understood according to their specific nature, not as an appendix to general policy. In the field of sports the most outstanding challenge is the decided support for Barcelona's candidacy for Olympic city in 1992.

## Public Health Policy

The views in the area of public health are the following: actions must respond to accurate planning, the rights of consumers will be defended, the infrastructure of public health resources will be ordered, and a single, decentralized public health system will be set up. All this is linked to a decided policy of fostering public health and carrying out a national health survey as well as the legislative support of the central government.

The social services, according to what the program summary says, are understood in a coordinated way within a national social services plan.

The statements on the public function are in line with the proposals of the department immediately after the last parliamentary debate. More important is the chapter devoted to citizen safety, since it asks for a strengthening of the Catalan autonomous policy and a more active presence of the government in this sector.

12448

CSO: 3548/179

## ASSESSMENT OF SIXTH POPULAR ALLIANCE CONGRESS

Madrid YA in Spanish 30 Jan 84 p 9

[Article by Francisco Lopez de Pablo, special correspondent]

[Text] Barcelona--The Sixth Popular Alliance Congress has confirmed this party as the second political force in Spain and nucleus of the Popular Coalition that guarantees to Spaniards the possibility of choice, thus strengthening the democratic system.

The Congress has shown that Fraga is the undisputed leader of the coalition; that Popular Alliance has a party with national organization; that the Right is not divided as its adversaries say and that it has tables and charts prepared and solutions programmed for the problems of the country.

The day of the closing session of the Congress, in spite of the fact that the president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, sought to neutralize it by presenting his electoral program, the nearly 12,000 seating capacity of the Barcelona Sports Palace was filled, after the mammoth Saturday supper-meeting that exceeded all organizational estimates and showed the growth of Popular Alliance in Catalonia, foretelling better results than those the polls reflect for the candidate of the coalition to the Generalitat, Eduardo Bueno.

Fraga: "We are the second force"

Fraga was to close the Congress amidst the unbridled enthusiasm of his followers. With a tremor in his voice, after giving thanks to God and the "Moreneta" [Blessed Virgin Mary] for success, he asserted that Popular Alliance was taking shape clearly as the second political force in Spain, although for a very short time because soon, he said, we are going to be the first. He recalled that Popular Alliance had contributed to strengthening the democratic, constitutional system, as well as the government of the autonomous regions. "The time for utopias is past," said Fraga. "Nothing has improved, nearly everything has worsened and new fronts of deterioration have opened. We have aggravated, by erroneous means, the security crisis of Spaniards." Just then he read the agency telegram in which he was informed of the attempt on the life of the ex-field-marshal of the First Military Region, Guillermo Quintana Lacacci, which was greeted with murmurs of surprise by the Congress, which stood up and paid him the tribute of a silent prayer. It was the most moving moment of the closing day.

But Fraga went on to say that "Now it is obvious everywhere that socialism cannot yield solutions. Socialism everywhere has devoured its own programs. And there is no possibility," Fraga added, "of fooling the unemployed, or their families, with schemes and tricks like early retirements, temporary contracts in which one job is multiplied artificially by three, etcetera. After promising change, heredity is invoked to explain why no changes are forthcoming. The Spanish people have been swindled, in the most lamentable way," Fraga added.

#### To Get Out of the Crisis

"We are in the midst of a great world crisis," the AP leader went on to say, "and Europe is more than ever divided in two and on both sides of the curtain, in a serious economic crisis, more serious on the socialist side, by the way. We have to be capable of making more than statements, demonstrations, or engaging in witch hunts. We have to start creating a climate of trust toward a new international economic order and a clearer position of security. Today, the world that counts (the United States, Japan, Germany, England, etc.) is clearly going towards solutions like those which Popular Alliance is proposing. Today the true radicals, the authentic progressives, are not those who continue to seek solutions in bureaucratization, or in the egalitarian distribution of a wealth which they themselves destroy, when they put an end to stimulus and trust. In this return to our roots, we return to what unifies, and not to what separates; to social solidarity, and not to the class struggle. We again recognize that work, seriousness, saving, study and respect are what raise societies. We must rebuild a social order that is both stable, just, and undergoing dynamic, prudent reform."

#### To Calm Spain Down

"Spain," Fraga added, "needs to settle, calm down, and stop worrying; it needs once and for all to overcome the transition and its improvisations; to devote its energies, not to an interminable discussion of the rules of the game and of the characters in the work, but to substantial issues: to study, the creation of businesses, raising the level and the quality of life. Spain needs a creative and encouraging environment, not a climate of frustrations and despair. Neither socialisms nor nationalisms are capable of offering suitable solutions. They only try to feed on stirring up passions without presenting any real solutions."

"In the face of so many major and minor operations, designed or intended to fragment what must be united," said Fraga, referring to operation Roca, "we are going to remind Spaniards that in union there is strength. Minor disagreements must take second place. Let no one think we can win without work, without sacrifices and without a maximum exemplariness. I especially ask for that effort and that exemplariness from all those who exercise public, representative office, on whose conduct the creditability of all the others depends."

"Only the people can give us their trust, if we deserve it, and break the alleged ceilings: but we must deserve it." Fraga concluded with a tremor



in his voice entrusting his work to God, because as the immortal Catalan poet Mossen Jacint Verdaguer said, "God is the one who raises and uplifts peoples." He asked the candidates to vote for Messrs. Mayor Oreja and Bueno for presidents of the Basque Country and Catalonia.

#### Criticisms of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]

Throughout the course of the speeches by the members of the Coalition who were present--Schwartz and Fontan, representing Liberal Union, and Oscar Alzaga, representing the PDP [People's Democratic Party],--numerous criticism were leveled at the socialist government. Schwartz said of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moran, that he was "like a detective from the 'Pink Panther' when he opens the door and falls in the pool." He also criticized the other ministers, and said of Alfonso Guerra that he was our future "Nobel prize in Physics." Fontan received much applause when he loyally offered the work of the liberals for the Coalition. Oscar Alzaga, in a fairly cold speech, also reiterated his intention to combine forces in the Coalition and seek solutions without reserve for the problems of freedom and of social justice that Spain has. He recognized the leadership of Fraga in the Coalition and when he mentioned the member of the PDP, Mayor Oreja, Coalition candidate for lendakari in the Basque Country, the whole Congress gave a standing ovation to the Basque representatives for their difficult task.

The secretary general, Jorge Verstrynge, said that socialism is "a stagnant has-been," and found fault with it as "a cynic that does not withstand criticism." "It is a myth," Verstrynge added, "that culture and the intellectuals are with the Left; it is a myth that they are defenders of freedoms. They have brought us a change, but they have kept what was left over." He also attacked the hinge parties as the main ones responsible for a presumed new socialist victory and accused these parties of being the Trojan horses of socialism, and concluded by saying that the spare part of the change was in AP, but with original parts. "And in the next Congress," Verstrynge concluded amid thunderous applause, "we shall speak of the Government."

The president of the government [Xunta] of Galicia, Fernandez Albor, said that AP began its revival in his region, and stated that the party was going to keep on breaking ceilings in the forthcoming autonomous elections, because the right that is here has never governed, because in the previous regime it was something else and in the transition it was not that moderate, open, generous, democratic, autonomous right that says yes to progress, to culture, to social justice, to freedom; which is not in favor of privileges or of the interests of anyone and which has an unquestionable leader, with ethics and with the capacity to govern.

#### Foreign Delegates

Among the outstanding foreign delegates participating, Otto von Hapsburg, along with Count Hans Huyn, represented Franz Joseph Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian CSU and reiterated the support of their respective parties and of Germany for the entry of Spain in the Community and in NATO, as did Lord Thomas, the representative of the British Prime Minister.

## BIRAND ON KEY BAROMETERS IN 1984 RELATIONS WITH WEST

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 Jan 84 p 7

[Article by M. Ali Birand]

[Text] Strasbourg -- In which direction Turkey's relations with the West will develop in 1984 is tied to the policies of two important organizations. The approaches of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, which will make a decision in the days ahead, and the American Congress, whose decision will be reached following that, will affect how the Turkish community appears to the western world. The Council of Europe, in work begun yesterday, and the American Congress will set forth their positions by the end of the year. It is necessary that these two organizations act very carefully when making a transition from a critical period insofar as their flightiness, apparent from time to time, and their narrowmindedness will not be able to be eliminated.

The decision to be made next week by the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly will be considered the "key" to Turkey's relations with Europe, and all other European organizations will adjust their policies accordingly.

Council delegates undoubtedly know that they are not taken in any European country as seriously as they are in Turkey. Furthermore, they also know very well that the voting they will do and the bylaws and so forth they will pass will have a political quality more than technical bases. It is also obvious that the large majority of the members do not possess definitive knowledge about what really has taken place in Turkey.

The warning I, as a person who places importance on the Council of Europe and who holds the same values it does, wish will reach the respected delegates is related to the depth of meaning attached to the vote they make. The council must be very well aware that, at this session to which new Turkish delegates come with dust on their feet, a vote that means their expulsion will result in Turkey's complete separation from the council.

If such an event occurs, neither human rights, which they wish to promote, causes of a political quality, for which they wish to demonstrate sensitivity, nor true democracy can be served. To the contrary, at a time when a true democracy has begun to be approximated to the greatest extent, they will have added another blow to those already landed. The wounds they will open will be felt more deeply than they imagine.

The American Congress has returned following its recess and has begun work. Without invoking the name of God, proposals have begun to be made to cut off aid to Turkey.

Debates on the 1984-1985 budget will commence in the months ahead, and it is evident that the inclination to "penalize" Turkey for declaring independence for the Northern Turkish Cypriot Republic will be transformed into a movement.

This time, the approach will probably not result in a general arms embargo as it did from 1975 to 1978. However, a cutback in this area will leave deep scars on the Turkish public.

On one hand, the presidential election and, on the other hand, the Senate and House of Representatives' by-elections can cause a number of congressmen to be lured by the prospect of tens of thousands of votes.

If this happens, it must not be forgotten that America will suffer as much as Turkey does.

It must not be forgotten that the embargo imposed by congress in the past might have placed a material hardship on Turkey, but was also extremely beneficial. It awakened us to the world from our former somnolence and, in particular, made more realistic our outlook on our allies, for whose sake our fellowmen died in Korea.

Isn't it necessary for Turkey to do what it must in 1984, when Europe and America will define their positions?

Hasn't our time come to be accepted with sincerity by the communities we wish to enter rather than merely be subject to "strategic mercantilism" or "strategic blackmail" or samples of their value judgments?

Can't the fact yet be seen that we are forced to pay a far more important strategic price than the minor insults of a nation from which we receive all aid?

11673

CSO: 3554/144

## ULMAN ASSESSES TURKISH STATUS IN COE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 31 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by Haluk Ulman]

[Text] The January-February 1984 meeting of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly began yesterday in Strasbourg, France.

This meeting is important because the development of relations between Turkey and the Council of Europe will be delineated. If the delegates to the Consultative Assembly selected from the Turkish parliament had not participated in these meetings, the assembly would have dealt with the issue of Turkey's representation at the spring session, which will begin in May, and there would have been a great possibility for a positive outcome. Turkey, however, seeks to participate in the January-February meetings and is seen to be determined to do so.

The proposals of Consultative Assembly Chairman Ahrens, who came to Ankara last week, for several compromises in order to achieve agreement are known. For example, he proposed that the Turkish representatives refrain from seeking ratification of their credentials for the meetings -- that they participate with "observer" status. Turkey, however, did not accept this. Another option was that the delegates participate in the meetings, but that the assembly close its eyes and the procedure of approval of credentials be postponed until May, when a new working session begins. Turkey failed to endorse this as well.

In fact, even the Consultative Assembly's reaching the point of accepting Turkish delegates in May is a big step. The assembly decision made at the end of September read, "In the light of present-day conditions and information at hand, it cannot be seen that the Turkish parliament to be elected 6 November will represent the Turkish people in a democratic manner. Therefore, a delegation that will participate in the work of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly cannot be legally constituted."

However, subsequent developments, among them the holding of general elections and the coming to office of a civilian government elected by the people, caused the assembly majority to reconsider the virtue of the decision. This trend came out at the Consultative Assembly Political Commission meeting held in the

Canary Islands at the beginning of January. In commission reporter Steiner's report submitted to the commission, it was stated, "It is clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that a civilian government has taken office in Turkey and that the military administration has ended."

Alder, chairman of the Turkey High Commission composed of Political Commission and Legal Commission members, noted in a report submitted at the high-commission meeting held in the middle of January in Paris that, although political parties participating in the elections were restricted, the 6 November elections took place with complete integrity and freedom. He stated that he nurtures the hope that the Turkish parliament, which has recently begun work, will make progress on the issues of human rights and freedoms in the days ahead so as not to be held responsible for past practices in these areas and that local elections to be held soon will strengthen and completely authenticate the democratic regime. Despite the fact that there was no concrete proposal dealing with the January meetings in Steiner's report, Alder suggested that Turkish representatives participate in these meetings on a "temporary basis." Among the proposals was one that a final decision on this topic be made following the holding of local elections.

It can be seen that the Consultative Assembly is searching for an outlet in order to readmit the Turkish representatives, and it is expecting the local elections to reaffirm its view. There is no doubt that, later, there will be those who continue to come out against Turkey's return to the assembly. Among them are the Greek representatives, who do as they wish in the assembly as long as there are no Turkish delegates, and Greek Cypriot representatives, who, in all probability, will participate again in work during this period, as well as several leftist deputies who do not find practices dealing with human rights and freedoms measuring up to western standards. However, there is no doubt that those who will listen to common sense and who will say, "Yes," to Turkey's return are in the majority.

But, if Turkey categorically insists upon being reinstated in January or, in other words, participates with the request that Turkish delegates' credentials be approved at the meeting that begins today, it appears very difficult for an affirmative decision to be reached. Therefore, it is very difficult to attribute meaning to Turkey's intransigence. The announcements from the most official spokesmen in Turkey that, if our Consultative Assembly delegates are not accepted into the meeting, we will withdraw from the assembly render this insistence a little bit dangerous.

It is true that the Council of Europe's jurisdiction and sphere of work is very limited and that it cannot take measures that will harm the existence of a nation, and, from this standpoint, membership is not very important. It is also true that the council has not pursued an understanding policy towards Turkey since 12 September. There is also the fact that its position toward Turkey has progressed so far as to interfere with our nation's internal affairs. I am of the opinion, however, that all these truths do not make it right for us to do something wrong.

There is no country in the world today that can live or thrive alone. Each nation attempts to align itself with a powerful group of countries. As for Turkey, it has considered itself a western nation since the time of Ataturk



and has found itself a place in the West. The door to the West is through the Council of Europe. If Turkey withdraws from the Council of Europe, its relations with the West will be reduced to defense ties alone, and Turkey is not a mercenary army of the West, but an equal and sovereign part of it -- a view all of us have long defended. Where Turkey, left to itself by the West, would search for a new position for itself for a political philosophy and support is a separate problem that would emerge for us.

In addition, Turkey has important problems that need to be solved in the West. We have disagreements with Greece and the impasse on Cyprus. These are only the beginning. Wouldn't Turkey's withdrawal from the Council of Europe allow Greece to continue to do as it pleases in western Europe, bring to an end western Europe's support, and result in its coming out against us? Even those who, at one time, supported our withdrawal from NATO now see and understand that we have been able to achieve balance with Greece only within NATO and that the Cyprus action was able to be carried out without one or the other of the large nations' interference only within this framework. There is a need to calculate accurately the results that could materialize, from this standpoint, by withdrawal from the Council of Europe.

Finally, we say that we wish to maintain our relations with the EEC and, if possible, to become a member one day. The road leading to this is the Council of Europe. Do you consider it possible to join the EEC, which is a smaller community than the Council of Europe, if we withdraw from it, if it appears that we do not approve -- and that is the conclusion that, like it or not, would be drawn -- of its principles and goals?

As far as I am concerned, another opportunity to correct the mistakes made in the Council of Europe is essential for Turkey's national interests.

11673

CSO: 3554/143



## MDP'S SUNALP ON POLITICAL HEALTH OF PARTY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 31 Jan 84 pp 1,6

[Article by Fatih Gullapoglu]

[Text] MDP [National Democrat Party] Director General Turgut Sunalp, who is completing contacts with Istanbul provincial and administrative district organizations, assessed the resignations from the party saying, "I am pleased by the increase in resignations. Other parties' desire to join us and their kinship with us are evidence of our strength and health." In response to a question posed by a CUMHURIYET correspondent related to reports that Bulend Ulusu will form a party, Sunalp stated, "I am determined not to say anything shallow to Ulusu." He went on, "I do not deem it proper to entice anyone from within the party." Sunalp asserted, "We are strong. We are standing tall." He described Gaziantep Deputy Galip Deniz, who resigned from the party, as a "lovable man of 82 by his own reckoning and of 90, according to his associates, who sees very well, but who does not hear well. People at that age," he stated, "can be touchy and hypersensitive." Talking about the resignations of Assistant Professor Izzetin Dogan, a founding member, and his colleagues, he said, "Some men are astonished to hit a void in a place that has become theirs."

Sunalp, who came to Istanbul last Thursday and held a meeting with administrative district chairmen, explained at the meeting that what was sought was to start an artificial opposition within the party, but that the incident is over. Sunalp, who later made contact with officials and party members, will go to Ankara today. Prior to evaluating developments occurring in recent days related to the party, Sunalp spoke to a CUMHURIYET correspondent about the news appearing in an Istanbul paper that Ulusu will form a new party. He said:

"I am determined not to say anything shallow about Ulusu. Various statements are being made. Look for yourself and reach your own conclusions. However, some reporters seek to distort what is said and to incite others. I will not become a party to this.

"I am not against Ulusu. I chose politics as a serious profession. My life has progressed at full speed. I see politics as a sincere and eminent profession. I do not deem it correct to incite people to leave the party and such things as that. We are strong. We are standing tall."

Sunalp reported that the contrived movement of the three party members came to light through the statements of their own provincial chairmen, but that, for some reason or other, the movement did not materialize. He said, "What happened was that they talked about 19 provinces at first, and the number fell to four the next day. All of our colleagues in the party know the inside story concerning this problem. We also explained it to those who did not know, and the incident was over." Sunalp continued:

"I am pleased by the increase in resignations. Other parties' kinship with us -- that is, their desire to belong to us -- is evidence that we are strong and healthy. We are an alternate government party."

When analyzing the resignations of Assistant Professor Dogan, a founding member, and 12 colleagues, Sunalp said:

"Persons who insisted on Dogan at one time and who helped him become administrator resigned. He waited and waited, and then he also resigned. Several persons are astonished to hit a void in a place that has become theirs. My acting impulsively is not at issue. Let fading spring judge the soul of the cypress. The same games have been played in this country for years. There have been those who have gone from here to there, who have made promises of advantages, who have carried out intrigues. This is not the first resignation. As a matter of fact, I registered new members into the party in the district of Eyup today."

Sunalp, who visited the Sultan Mausoleum yesterday in Eyup, went to Eyup Administrative District headquarters. Responding to a question while there, Sunalp talked about Galip Deniz, who had resigned the day before. He said, "Deniz is a beloved old man who sees very well, but who does not hear well and who is 82 years old by his own reckoning, but 90 according to others. He was second candidate and was chosen because of vetoes."

Speaking about Ozal and the ANAP, Sunalp said that this party took its name both from the left and the right and combined both factions under one head through Ozal. When reporters urged him to repeat this act, Sunalp said that this was not repeated and that what was done was done in a spirit such that "soon, Ozal will also notice me."

11673

CSO: 3554/144

## AIR FORCE ENGINEERS' ROLE IN RUNWAY, AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION

Paris AIR ACTUALITES in French Jan 84 pp 25-32

[Article by Frederic Dony]

[Text] The operation of aircraft requires a powerful infrastructure on the ground: the platform--runway, aprons, and taxiways--and its immediate surroundings. The NCO's, specialized volunteer enlistees, and conscripts whose job it is to keep our military air infrastructure in operational condition are trained at the 15th Air Force Engineer Regiment [RGA] in Toul.

## Complex Organization

Consisting of sappers taken from the "air force draft" and led by officers and NCO's from the (Army) Engineers, the three air force engineer units--the 15th Regiment based in Toul, the 25th Regiment based in Compiègne, and the 45th Augmented Company in Istres--are at the disposal of the air force, which equips and maintains them from its own budget. They come under the Air Force Engineers specialized major command, which is headed by an air force general officer and whose staff is located at the Villacoublay Air Base. The Air Force Engineers comprise a total of 2,300 individuals (two-thirds of whom are conscripts), including a few air force officers, NCO's, and regular enlisted men, and have 1,400 vehicles and items of miscellaneous equipment.

The mission of the Air Force Engineers Specialist Training Center (CISGA), which is attached to the 15th RGA in Toul, is to train young specialists who, "after a period of training as such, improve their proficiency by working on construction projects in the companies of corps engineers."

## Mission of 15th RGA: "To Train and Build"

The regiment currently provides military and technical training for all its personnel and keeps its equipment in working order. It is also responsible for mobilizing and training Air Force Engineers reserve personnel. Along with that, the 15th RGA carries out numerous infrastructure projects at the air bases: runway repairs, platform improvements, and related protective structures. Carrying out those projects also provides training for the wartime mission.

The regiment therefore has a double role: "to train and build" under the motto "act quickly and powerfully."

#### Proper Equipment

The regiment comprises about 1,000 individuals: 200 cadres, including a number of air force NCO's, and 800 conscripts (80 percent of the total manpower!).

In addition to its various utility vehicles, the 15th RGA has every kind of earthmoving equipment that would be used by a construction firm: scraping tractors, tractor-loaders, power shovels, graders, and rollers. There are also various kinds of equipment for mixing and pouring concrete and surfacing materials: concrete mixing plant, asphalt mixing plant, road finishers,\* asphalt spreaders, grit spreaders, and so on. Thousands of conscripts have learned to use that machinery and equipment before joining the other air force engineer units.

The regimental staff consists of six companies: one headquarters and service company, two construction companies, one support company, and two training companies (the 11th and 14th). The latter company provides the support for the CISGA.

#### Military Training in 11th Company

On arriving in Toul, conscripts receive 6 weeks of basic military training in the 11th Training Company: "our future specialists are soldiers first." Six times a year, nearly 150 new recruits, most of them from eastern France (primarily Lorraine), arrive for training.

During their first month, the sappers undergo "basic all-arms training (FETTA), at the end of which they participate in a "rally." The varied infrastructure necessary for their training consists of a Ballplast gallery practice range inside the barracks compound and of additional land outside for military exercises: the Ecrouves Plateau with its old fort (for combat and cross-country exercises), Fort Chanot, Domgermain, and rifle ranges for practice with weapons and explosives (Bois l'Eveque and Val des Nonnes).

Fifteen days of "additional all-arms training" complete the military training of the young sappers.

#### Driving School

At the IEC (Basic Drivers Training) school, some conscripts are tested on the Highway Code, learn to drive, and are taught the essentials of vehicle maintenance. In that way, they obtain the various licenses for operating light vehicles, trucks, heavy trucks, or even trailer trucks after several weeks of training. Most of those acquiring licenses to operate light vehicles and trucks then become drivers of light vehicles, trucks, and simple equipment in the construction engineer companies.

---

\* Or binder spreaders.

The best of them join the NCO trainee platoon to prepare for the basic technical certificate qualifying them as "cadre NCO's." Then they in turn take charge of training new recruits, either in Toul as cadre instructors or driving instructors or in another air force engineer unit.

Lastly, the "11th" is also responsible for pretraining the sappers in "patch" work, which covers the rapid repair of platforms and takeoff runways. This training is continued and rounded out during maneuvers.

#### Next Step Is CISGA

Before being assigned to a construction engineer company, some sappers undergo a period of training in their specialty (equipment operation, black products, and so on) in the 14th Company, which is the regiment's second training unit. This unit supports the Specialist Training Center in all branches of construction, training both conscripts and regulars. The center's basic mission is "the instruction of trainees and the execution of construction projects as part of the practical application of the subjects taught."

#### "Utilize Abilities"

For that purpose, the CISGA's Equipment Section trains all construction equipment operators, its Infrastructure Section is responsible for all training programs related to "roads and airfields," and its Construction Engineering Department is in charge of topographic surveys, soil studies, and the testing of concrete and black products.

Its cadre instructors and assistant instructors include about 20 corporals (all volunteer enlistees) and many conscripts who already possessed a CAP [vocational certificate] in construction equipment operation or in construction engineering and design. The latter are assistant instructors in their specialties.

One of them told us: "It's a good thing that the Air Force Engineers utilize the abilities and experience of young men who know their job."

We should point out that the CISGA's main mission is to provide basic training for equipment operators, and the training it provides is recognized by the National Public Works Federation.

One company officer said: "As part of their national service, conscripts can gain experience and a diploma that are accepted in civilian life, and this helps them find a job when they get out."

NCO's promoted from the ranks follow one of two kinds of training to obtain either a basic technical certificate as an equipment operator or one in construction engineering and design. The latter consists of general training in basic construction methods, followed by a phase of specialization in various fields: concrete paving, black products, drafting, surveying, or soil studies.

Privates can obtain a practical certificate in various specialties--concrete pouring, the pouring of black products, or construction equipment operation--in 3 weeks.



## Equipment Operator in 3 Weeks

For teaching its trainees, the CISGA has all the equipment that a large construction firm would have: a concrete mixing plant, a very modern black product plant, equipment for pouring concrete and black products, soil study and topographic laboratories, and about 20 pieces of construction equipment.

Those tractor-loaders, hydraulic shovels, scraping tractors, graders, and bulldozers are driven only by the trainees.

With their steel equipment, they drive, dig, grade, move tons of earth and rock, and maneuver just as though they were at a real construction site. From time to time, a trainee stops his equipment and gets down to take advice from his instructor and correct his mistakes.

About 30 hours of driving on the grounds at La Sabliere are necessary to be able to handle those impressive machines in any situation.

One instructor explains: "When young equipment operators from the CISGA join a construction engineer company, a short period of adaptation is all it takes for them to operate newer equipment without any particular difficulty."

The regiment also maintains its equipment. That is the job of the Corps of Engineers Shop, which takes care of third-level repairs and is responsible for the repair and maintenance of some 300 vehicles and 200 pieces of construction equipment.

## "Practical Work"

The personnel being trained sometimes have the opportunity to gain experience at real construction sites, and this gives them a change of pace from the training field at La Sabliere! As part of its training program, the company performs minor construction jobs in the regiment's barracks area--such as repairing sidewalks or roads. "That 'practical' work enables the trainees to improve their skills while performing specific, useful, and appreciated work."

## Infrastructure Specialists

As the Engineer Training Center (CIG), the 14th Company is also responsible for the technical training of conscripts in the ranks and young engineer NCO's in the field of "infrastructure projects." To begin with, the conscripts spend 8 weeks in a training program leading to the basic technical certificate--covering basic construction methods--and to a specialization. When NCO's are changing specialties, this is where they receive several weeks of training to earn the technical certificate in infrastructure projects, level 1 [CT1] and level 2 [CT2].

They begin with CTL--the surfacing of roads and airfields (with black products and concrete) and construction engineering (BETP, which covers the design and supervision of construction, the organization of worksites, soil studies, and



so on)--and then go on to CT2: BETP in air force infrastructure (topography, familiarity with air bases, and so on).

Those two certificates are the equivalents respectively of the basic certificate and the advanced specialty certificate.

#### Miscellaneous Courses as Needed

The CISGA also offers miscellaneous courses. For example, it is the only center authorized by the air force to train reconnaissance teams for improvised fields on which a Transall can land in complete safety. These "improvised field" training courses are organized for personnel from the 11th Paratroop Division, especially the 17th Paratroop Engineer Regiment (17th RGP). "This training makes it possible to organize small six-member teams that will be responsible for accurately evaluating the landing possibilities and finding suitable assault platforms in France or overseas."

The center in Toul also trains enlisted men as hydraulic shovel specialists. They are assigned to the signal companies of the Air Force Signal Command (CTAA).

Lastly, the CISGA can, at the request of the Air Force Engineer Command, set up other special training programs in such fields as topography, soil study laboratories, and construction equipment operation.

#### Finding a Job After Discharge

For several years the 14th Company has provided training programs leading to the construction equipment operator certificate (CCETP), which is equivalent to a vocational certificate (CAP) as an equipment operator. All conscripts--as well as volunteer enlistees at the end of their contract--who have been equipment operators during their national service in the air force engineer units return here to prepare for the CCETP, which is issued by the National Public Works Federation (FNTP).

At the conclusion of three periods of training (theoretical, practical, and advanced technical education), the qualification of the candidates for that certificate is judged by a joint committee consisting of representatives of the FNTP (officials responsible for vocational training in construction and company executives) and cadres from the Air Force Engineers.

"We train qualified young men who, with this diploma recognized in civilian life, can find jobs and become equipment operators."

Those about to be discharged also obtain information from their units concerning available jobs in the region's construction firms.

In 1982, the CISGA trained 200 equipment operators, 60 enlisted men, and 40 NCO's in the "infrastructure projects" branch. While providing the Air Force Engineers with competent specialists capable of fulfilling their mission, the regiment's training companies, and especially the CISGA, also enable the conscripts to gain experience that can be useful to them in the French construction industry after their national service is completed.

11798

CSO: 3519/200

## INCLUSION OF REFERENCE TO NATO URGED IN DEFENSE BLUEPRINT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 7 Feb 84 p 11

[Text] According to reports disseminated by the news media, the draft of the blueprint for Spanish defense prepared by the Ministry of Defense does not mention or refer to NATO. This omission is the main difference, as to content, from the draft defense blueprint approved in April 1982 by the Congress of Deputies. At that time, it was considered desirable immediately to negotiate Spanish integration into the western world defense block. Thus, after a draft was prepared which pointed out the need for the integration, another draft is now being prepared in which NATO is not mentioned, now that we have already joined it.

Again, when this specific contradiction appeared to have been settled within the government party, it bounces back in this text with a conflict between the supporters of Spanish integration and those who, directly or indirectly, support complete withdrawal or just a symbolic adherence. At the same time that other kinds of internal differences among the socialists are being aired, it is not just a coincidence that a disagreement is reappearing with regard to a key aspect of our foreign and defense policy. Realists and doctrinarians are confronting each other head on.

In the same way and to the same degree that the economic controversy is paralyzing the government economic projects, the reappearance of the polemic on NATO is blocking a serious and meticulous proposal on defense policy. How can one speak of a draft defense blueprint without clarifying the question as to whether we do or do not remain in the western world defense block? This question raises another more serious one: Is it really possible to defend Spain from the Soviet threat outside the NATO military mechanism? The replies to these two questions seem closely linked to that of the possibilities, greater or lesser, for the consolidation of a democratic political system.

After a year of socialism it is not acceptable, on a matter so vital to our national interests and those of the NATO community of nations, to have this policy of trying to go swimming without getting our feet wet. Before this draft proposal goes beyond the doors of Congress, the government should seriously debate the inclusion of a reference to the Alliance.

Recently, the prime minister has repeatedly indicated, explicitly and implicitly, his support for definitive integration and he appears to be only waiting for an opportune moment to announce this to his fellow party members. But this waiting period is being used by doctrinarians placed in high government posts to implement a policy of fait accompli such as in the preparation of this draft blueprint. Thus it is urgently necessary for Felipe Gonzalez to pick up a pen and add a paragraph on NATO to that text which was, paradoxically, prepared at the Ministry of Defense.

9204

CSO: 3548/187

## NATIONAL BANK ON GOVERNMENT POLICY, LACK OF INVESTMENTS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Pierre Effinier: "National Bank Encourages Martens but Deplores Declining Investment"]

[Text] The report of the National Bank contains no hot revelations about the franc. Instead, it confirms what the finance minister said on the subject 10 days ago.

On the other hand, it gives implicit full marks to the government's economic policy, since the directions proposed for the future are along the lines that Martens V has been following since 1982: reducing government expenditures and helping businesses to make a profit so that they can think of realizing job-creating investments.

But these are full marks with no illusions about the concrete effects of the economic policy.

With a terrible verdict! In 1983, investments in business firms were 4 percent lower in volume. (Therefore, at constant prices, this means implied inflation.)

This comes after 2 years during which companies were pampered. After the "300 billion" of the Cooreman law, which they were already known to have used, it is true, to pay off debts, even with double jobs reduced in number.

We can begin to breathe again in the face of this lack of reaction when we learn from the officials of our Broadcasting Institute that investments in the manufacturing industry alone should increase by 10 percent (also in volume) in 1984.

This is not a unilaterally optimistic report! That is almost the same as saying that an occasionally disenchanted tone hovers over the columns of the annual document the National Bank made public this morning. Everything is happening as if the Broadcasting Institute, a little like the rest of us, was surprised that all is not going better in the Belgian economy. After so many sacrifices.

Actually, the economy has not functioned as predicted. A country's economy, the BN [National Bank] seems to be telling us, cannot maneuver as easily as a

marshaling yard, not even with Martens V at the wheel.

It is true that the European-cooperative countries, themselves victims of the crisis, have not given Belgium much of anything, and this explains a good deal.

There are, in spite of everything, other things besides worrisome aspects in this report, which is more voluminous every year. (They are talking about a two-volume edition!)

#### Very Nice Profits for Businesses

The most lucid point concerns the corporations. Their disposable income (the net profit achieved and the payments on debts, made possible by the results) went up 23 percent in 1983, after 16 in 1982! One is reminded of the situation in 1974, before the big deterioration in business profits. The manufacturing industry was favored: textiles, chemicals, metal manufacturing, electricity.

#### A Foreign Trade Nearing Equilibrium

Another very satisfying point is the return to a condition approaching equilibrium for our foreign payments, thanks to the recovery of our exportation and the curbing of importation. The current deficit of the UEBL [Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union] ("goods and services" more than transfers) amounts to just 40 billion, against 120 billion in 1982 and 156 billion in 1981. (Belgium alone had piled up a staggering current deficit of 720 billion in 7 years.)

#### The State's "Unpaid Bill" is a Little Less Pressing

Another success is that encountered, as is well known, in financing the budgetary deficit. Not that the deficit has been lowered, for it went from 509 billion to 525 billion, but the 1983 financing structure was improved: long-term loans, 52 percent, against 13 percent in 1982, and foreign loans to a limit of 27 percent, against 49 percent. These debts are less "awkward" for the debtor-state.

Business, foreign trade and the beginning of stabilization in the accounts of the Treasury. Remedies have therefore been applied, with Martens V, where the shoe was pinching the most. But what about the rest?

#### Withdrawal of Investments

One of the biggest disappointments is the lack of investment in businesses, in spite of the above-mentioned expansion of profits. The "volume of fixed asset expenditures" on the part of corporations sagged in 1983. A terrible diagnosis. Which will be mentioned again.

Is it reassuring nevertheless? Investment resumption does not usually occur until one year after a "very short recovery." But in 1983 the economy began to react better in our manufacturing industry, as we saw above.

National Bank officials are presently attaching great importance to a survey of manufacturing companies which makes it possible to predict a 10-percent increase

in the volume of their investments for 1984. (Inflation is expected to be 5 percent in 1984.)

#### Deterioration of the Current Balance at the end of 1983

Although the not very brilliant other side of the good results obtained by businesses is the lack of investment, the "tails" side of the success of our current balance is assuredly a reversal in the negative sense of those payments involving other countries in the last months of 1983. What is responsible are the more significant imports and exports that are perhaps not as good. It is noteworthy that, according to the BN, the competitiveness of Belgian products did not further improve in 1983, after the marvelous progress in 1982, the year of the devaluation.

#### The Price to be Paid for Living Well in the Past

Although the financing of the budgetary deficit became a little better balanced for the government in 1983, the annual deficit itself is still appalling. No one is "doing better" than we are in Europe, with a proportion the equivalent of 13 percent of the creation of wealth realized by Belgium in 12 months, the GNP [gross national product].

Everyone agrees on the necessity of reducing this deficit, but, the BN will say, everyone also agrees that the buck should be passed to one's neighbor when the time comes to make sacrifices. And then, to lower the government's style of living is not so simple: to diminish the budgetary deficit by "X," would require, it seems, reducing the government's expenditures by 2 x "X."

#### And the Franc?

Before its present difficulties, the franc was doing better in 1983, until the relative deterioration in foreign trade in the last months. But currency is also dependent on the movements of capital of private individuals, which have become the principal cause of the total deficit in our payments involving foreign countries.

The total "current" deficit plus capital operations is 145 billion, much more satisfactory than the 287 billion in 1982 and the 357 billion in 1981.

The National Bank pays special attention to describing the magnitude of the flight of capital. In 7 years, these private operations will have totaled 380 billion, in balances, the greatest part of which was converted into foreign securities, one suspects. (Legal operations, in any case, falling under the heading of transfer of capital.)

The bank also attaches great importance to the development of its gold and foreign currency reserves, which run the risk (like a mortgage registration) of having to pay the final bill for our surplus importation and our net private capital investments abroad.

Here are a few figures. The reserves may be evaluated at a little less than 1,000 billion FB [Belgian francs]. (Let us recall that in 1980, the flash of



gold carried our gold and silver reserves alone to 1,000 billion, and some people dreamed of exploiting this "lode" by selling part of it. Since that time, gold has collapsed.)

If our gold and foreign currency reserves still belong to us, it is because Belgium continues to have recourse to the credit of the international bankers. The administration's foreign debts are over the above-mentioned 1,000 billion! (On the other hand, our "unpaid bill" owed to the Monetary Fund is still blank.)

What Directions for the Government?

What advice for the long run does the National Bank offer those public and private managers who run our economy and our finances?

Certainly not an extension of the government's role. Once more there appears to be hope for those little-loved entities of not so long ago, the business firms. "Investments for expansion" and "birth of new activities," "quality of management," "increased future competitiveness." All of that is eminently to be desired, according to the Broadcasting Institute, so the Belgian economy can get back on the track.

The bank is also betting on the international environment, Belgium being just a pivot. Growth in the world could be supported in 1984, "by an enormous deterioration in the United States' current balance of payments."

8946

CSO: 3619/33

## PLANNING BUREAU ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1988

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Guy Depas: "Planning Bureau: 817,000 Unemployed in 1988"]

[Text] From 582,000 at the end of 1983, the total number of unemployed could reach 817,000 at the end of 1988. At that time, real unemployment could strike 18.9 percent of the population of working age, compared to 13.7 percent last year.

These forecasts are taken from the new medium-term macro-economic projection just prepared by the Planning Bureau at the government's request. The Bureau says the projection arouses fear of a continuation of the loss of jobs in private employment with no serious counterpart jobs in public employment.

This would result in a worrisome economic situation, in an increasing number of persons arriving on the labor market, and in the no less alarming erosion of job offers. During the period studied, the number of working age persons would in fact swell by 81,000, while the number of jobs would diminish by 152,000, despite an increase of 13,000 civil service positions.

Like any prospective approach, the Planning Bureau's projections can be questioned. Nevertheless, falling at the moment when the prime minister is letting it filter out that he intends to utilize the traditional budgetary control of the beginning of the year to start a several-year plan to stabilize the public finances (3 or 4 years), they are more than ever in danger of intervening in the debate, which is difficult to speed up, between the right and the left in the government. Beyond correcting the 1984 budgetary skid--35.6 billion instead of the expected 25 or 30 billion, according to the details that Philippe Maystadt will present to the council of ministers on Friday--it is obvious, in fact, that this debate will turn around the following problem: does 2 years' experience with unconstrained stimulation of the profitability of business firms demand that proof be given of great selectivity?--when the precise goal is to restore employment capacity and when the above-mentioned means to recovery that are used are deducted from the workers' purchasing power and thus indirectly, in consequence, from fiscal revenues and social contributions.

Among its other conclusions, the Planning Bureau still envisages only a very low average growth rate for the Belgian economy between now and 1988. This figure is

1.7 percent per year, the trend, however, being toward a gradual improvement as time goes on. The growth, the Bureau says, would be derived largely from net exports. The domestic demand, especially private consumption will scarcely re-adjust, the Planning Bureau estimates. In fact, the domestic demand would increase only because of investment in business, which would increase after 1986 (the demand for housing would become positive again only in 1988).

If the predictions were to be confirmed, it would mean that at the industrial investment level, the policy conducted up to now by Martens V would not really bear fruit until after the end of the present session of the legislature.

#### Less Inflation

As far as inflation is concerned, the projection is relatively encouraging. The Planning Bureau figures the increase in consumers' prices between 1983 and 1988 at an average of 6.3 percent. But it makes one important comment: although up to 1984 it was chiefly imported inflation that played a part, subsequently we have to expect to see domestic pressures take the larger role, especially with the end of the wage freeze. Here, the analysts bring water to the mill of the prime minister and the finance minister, who just yesterday said they were in favor of a return to salary moderation.

As far as the budget itself is concerned, although the Planning Bureau says it is taking into account, besides recent economy measures, subsequent very voluntaristic hypotheses on the subject of expenditures, the objective pursued by Martens V of reducing the total deficit would be a long way from attainment in 1988. The deficit would still be 10.8 percent of the gross national product at the end of the period.

8946

CSO: 3619/33

## 'PEIRAIKI-PATRAIKI' OFFICIAL ON INDUSTRIAL CRISIS

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1547, 29 Dec 83 pp 59-60

/Interview with Aris Katsambas, managing director of the "Peiraiki-Patraiki" company, by Ath. Kh. Papandropoulos; date and place not specified/

/Excerpts/ In a revealing interview with OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, the managing director of the "Peiraiki-Patraiki" company speaks openly and emphasizes both those factors that brought about a crisis in this big Greek industrial enterprise as well as how the current difficulties can be overcome.

Question: Mr Katsambas, without any doubt "Peiraiki-Patraiki" is in a terrible financial situation while its future is rather gloomy. In your opinion, what immediate measures can help improve the situation?

Answer: Regardless of the reasons that brought about today's unsatisfactory financial situation, what is needed in present conditions is an objective view of reality. Unfortunately, the latter tells us that "Peiraiki-Patraiki" is facing high monetary financial expenditures that represent 30 percent of its business turnover. As you may well understand, with the burden of these expenditures, even with an improvement of the firm's productivity, the results would still be negative. This is so because with what margins of gross profits must the firm work so as to cover the huge monetary financial expenditures and other operational expenses?

In my opinion, therefore, the most satisfactory attempt to solve our problems must be the influx into the company of interest-bearing capital. And this cannot be done except with an increase in the company's capital stock.

Question: The fact that the company is suffering from huge monetary financial expenditures raises, in my view, a basic question: why was a borrowing policy followed? In other words, what reasons led the company to incur such debt with the result being that it is now in danger?

Answer: There are many reasons that go back to the expansion policy that we had drawn up on a long-term basis. And this policy could not be changed from one day to the next.

So, we were led to follow the goals of our program, while, on the other side of the coin, we did not want to create social problems by saying that we were abandoning every effort because of a recession. We had to move forward. At the same time, our expansion program in a period of crisis was accompanied by a series of irregularities in the implementation of our projects that imposed a great burden on the company.

Therefore, the inevitable situation did not develop as it should have and so the present unfortunate problems were created. However, besides the above-mentioned factors, problems for the company were created by the foreign currency losses that resulted from the continuous changes in the parity of the drachma. For a firm like "Peiraiki-Patraiki" which exports 42 percent of its production, foreign currency fluctuations play a vital role. We suffered great losses from this standpoint. To correct current weaknesses in this area we have to get out of our minds the concept of the dollar, just as we once did with the gold pound. The parity of the drachma must be fixed on the basis of European currencies. Only in this way will it be possible to bring about the foreign currency improvement in the finances of companies.

Question: Mr Katsambas, I come back to the matter of your company's borrowing policy. Outside, a lot of people believe that of the loan capital that you drew upon part was used for purposes other than for the company. Also, the impression is created by some that this capital was used by the company's management to create private property holdings. What do you have to say to these charges for which no proof is offered?

Answer: There is a Greek proverb that says "whoever is outside of the dance knows many songs." The same is true for whatever is being said to our detriment. Many believe that a company that employs 7,000 persons and makes 17 billion drachmas in business is a small-time business enterprise in which anyone can do what he wants without being checked on. My dear sir, when the spinning mill crisis erupted "Peiraiki-Patraiki" had already begun the proceedings for implementing an ambitious expansion program that would have ensured it better competitiveness, more exports and significant technological progress. Unfortunately, however, the well-known crisis arrived. So, what must we have done to stop today's rumors? Not to implement the program and to fire people? Despite unfavorable conditions, we preferred to continue, and now look at what the situation is.

Question: As the company manager, both you and your colleagues, Messrs Faidon, Iason, Thodoros and Stamos Stratos, in what status are you working in the company? Do you have a salary?

Answer: We in "Peiraiki-Patraiki" are in the same labor relations status that other cadres are. Our compensation is approved each time by the shareholders general council. We too are salaried.

Question: If you ceased managing the company, what would happen? Would you be normally discharged?

Answer: Of course. In case we withdrew, not on our will, we would submit to the regulations of Law 2112 that concerns discharges, compensations, etc.

Question: What is your evaluation? Will you remain in the company's leadership? If there is an increase in capital and the National Bank acquires the majority of shares, what would happen then? Will the same administration continue in the company?

Answer: The relations of a company with its bank are based on mutual trust. And the latter, from whatever we know and determine, does not appear to have been compromised. The work of the current administration is evaluated positively by the bank.

Question: Mr Katsambas, I have heard from many people that your company has become such a bureaucracy that it differs little from those slow-moving public organizations. To what extent is that true?

Answer: In truth, there are many instances where both bureaucratic phenomena and fear of assuming responsibility have been observed within the firm. This concerns two interwoven situations with one more general form of mentality that is prevalent in our country and that incites people not to want to accept many responsibilities. Many efforts have been undertaken in "Peiraiki-Patraiki" to combat this kind of mentality but it is not always easy. At any rate, we are not abandoning efforts that aim at making people who work in a business unit more responsible and efficient.

Question: Let us assume that "Peiraiki-Patraiki" finds interest-free capital that it needs. Then, what will be its future prospects? Can the 1981 and 1982 damage that amounts to 3 billion drachmas be absorbed? Is not the extent of these damages such that the future of the firm is threatened? Has not the interest that has accumulated because of the negative consequences of the last 2 years been prohibitive enough to create improved conditions?

Answer: Of course, the situation will not be ideal if the company's financing problem and especially the problem of interest is solved satisfactorily. Nevertheless, there are many things that give us some optimism. "Peiraiki-Patraiki" is an exceptional competitive firm and from the standpoint of relationship between business turnover and gross profits we are the best in the world. In other words, we have, before interest and amortization, the greatest percentage of profit on an international level, something that is due to our significant investments for improving productivity and our technological progress.

At the same time, the picture of the firm on the international market is very good and its products are highly appreciated. All of this constitutes effective factors that inspire optimism if, indeed, the urgent problems that I previously mentioned are solved.

Question: Because I am not able to believe that the company's management does not also bear some of the responsibility for the present situation of "Peiraiki-Patraiki," could you point out, perhaps through some form of self-criticism, what mistakes you and your other colleagues committed?



Answer: We were exceptionally optimistic. While our country was getting ready to enter the European Economic Community we believed that the satisfactory conditions of the decade of the 70's would continue. In a broader sense, we did not provide for insurance factors in the programs that we had worked out. It did not come to our minds to ask ourselves: what would happen if some year things did not go well?

Question: If you had followed a more conservative approach after 1978, would not the governments of the time had charged you with "undermining" their economic policy? Did not the National Bank administration encourage you in your expansionist work for reasons of political expediency? Were not the investments you made in Samos made with the urging of the National Bank that wanted to show economic activity?

Answer: As I have told you, we appeared optimistic and we did not foresee certain mishaps some of which we were not responsible for. When it took DEI /Public Power Corporation/ 10 months to furnish us with electric power in Samos where we had set up a pilot technological unit, what was "Peiraiki-Patraiki's" responsibility for that? When they are slow in returning to us a billion drachmas in export subsidies and we borrow high interest capital to replace them, what do you want us to do? The other matter, Mr Papandropoulos, is complex just as is the case with the operation of a firm such as ours that is the number one in employment in the country.

Besides the above, however, there is another point that must be taken into consideration when talking about "Peiraiki-Patraiki." At the time we decided to make certain investments, not for the reasons mentioned above, we still had certain concrete advantages over our competitors that we wanted to increase with a rationalistic investment policy. To our bad luck, however, things did not work out satisfactorily.

Therefore, we could not foresee the linkage of the drachma to the dollar that took place under the Rallis government nor the income policy followed by that government. It was therefore natural that when the compensation for work in our company almost reached the levels of West Germany the game was lost. This was so because with lower productivity and a degree of organization not proportional to the cost of labor, "Peiraiki-Patraiki" lost its trump card. Despite all of this, I want you to believe that nothing is lost for our firm.

Question: Once that you have referred at length to the expansion policy that you followed at the end of the 70's decade, could you point out the most important factors that set limits to this policy?

Answer: Everything began in 1971 with the expansion of our third plant and the operation of the spinning mill in Karpenisi. In 1978, "Peiraiki-Patraiki" absorbed the Moutalaski company and renovated the latter's installations in Nea Ionia. In 1979, our company merged with the Gavriil company and bought out the Perfect spinning mill that was half-finished. Therefore, the Samos spinning mill was practically rebuilt from scratch. Specialists say that this plant is the most modern in the world.

Besides, in 1979 we began discussions with the French firm "Saic-Velcorex" that is the biggest velvet manufacturer in Europe. Goal of our talks with the French firm was to convince it that Greece had all the conditions for a joint undertaking of a modern spinning mill which, if it were to succeed in maintaining a full weekly employment schedule, would be able to manufacture goods of excellent quality at a competitive cost. After long negotiations the French were convinced by our arguments and in 1980 the founding contract of the Filiates Spinning Mill Company was signed. This mill can today produce 8 million meters of velvet a year.

Also in 1979, construction was begun on the presently well-known Textile Distribution Center of the company that is best distribution and warehouse center in Europe. Finally in 1981, "Peiraiki-Patraiki" bought the Van Delden group in West Germany, something that especially distressed some of our foreign competitors who wanted the West German firm for themselves. All of these investments over the 5-year period 1979-1982 amounted to 147 million dollars to which must be added 1.3 billion drachmas for the purchase of the above-mentioned plants. And to anticipate another of your questions, I want to add that the above investment initiatives were self-financed to an amount of 70 million dollars, the remaining resources coming from domestic and foreign loans. That, in short, is the road of the "Peiraiki-Patraiki" the past 5 years. This concerns a course that was based on the belief that Greece needs to become industrialized, that it needs new work positions and economic development. If now events and developments have not proven us right, that does not mean that the effort must be abandoned.

5671

CSO: 3521/163

## SPANISH OFFICIAL ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH TUNISIA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Jan 84 p 2

[Interview with Jose Luis Pardos, director general of international cooperation, by N. Ouerghi; date and place not specified]

[Text] Since King Juan Carlos of Spain visited Tunisia, there are indications that these two countries are determined to strengthen and increase their cooperation. As a matter of fact it is believed that the external imbalance in favor of Spain can be corrected through joint projects.

That is precisely the purpose of the current visit of a Spanish delegation headed by Jose Luis Pardos, director general of international cooperation.

To have a more exact idea of what the prospects of this cooperation are we thought it would be fruitful to meet Jose Luis Pardos who was kind enough to answer our questions.

[Question] What is the purpose of your visit to Tunisia?

[Answer] I should explain that after the visit which King Juan Carlos and the minister of foreign affairs paid to Tunisia we have come to this country to make sure that there is a follow-up to the decisions which were made.

In the course of the many meetings which we will have with Tunisian officials, we are going to try to find out the sectors where we can seek cooperation.

In the light of the information obtained, we intend to set the cooperation process in motion and reinforce it by starting with concrete actions.

[Question] Have you established a well-defined working program? If so, what are the main features of that program?

[Answer] I will point out that four working groups were set up even before we came to Tunisia. Each group will try to determine with the interested parties the possibilities of cooperation in specific sectors such as agriculture, health, tourism and vocational training.

In short, what we are trying to achieve is to find areas of common interest to set in motion the cooperation process.

To that effect, our task will be to get small and medium-sized enterprises from both countries interested and we will achieve this by promoting mutual contacts.

[Question] Promoting contacts is always a good idea but one must decide how to do it. Have you some experiment in mind?

[Answer] First, let me tell you that our cooperation has far-reaching aims. To bring new life into the relations between our countries we must find a platform for a lasting cooperation that will guarantee all future activity. For this reason we are going to start an experiment with young people.

On 26 March of this year, 10 young Tunisians from different sectors are going to Barcelona and Murcia for 3 weeks to meet with Spanish colleagues.

This pilot experiment, which can be expanded, is intended to get young people acquainted and to allow them to express themselves and discover common interests.

In return, Spanish youths from these two cities (selected because they have cultural affinities with Tunisia) will pay a visit to Tunisia establishing similar contacts.

[Question] Which are the fields where technical cooperation is possible between Tunisia and Spain?

[Answer] Our main purpose is to create joint companies. Also we are going to start with small-scale specific projects.

As for the spheres of activity, they are agriculture and more specifically fishing, vocational training and tourism.

For instance, scholarships will be given to train Tunisian forestry experts.

A school for deaf and mute students will be established in Tunisia. It will have audio-visual equipment. This experiment, financed by Spain, will initially operate on a reduced scale but can be expanded later on. In the sphere of tourism, young Tunisians will receive scholarships to undergo training in Spanish schools. Meanwhile, contacts will be established between tour operators to increase the flow of tourists. These are the broadlines of what was decided between the two countries and one should point out that this general picture could expand.

[Question] Now that the north-south and south-south cooperation has reached an impasse, what road can Tunisia and Spain take to complete their development?

[Answer] In view of the problems threatening the world, the decade of the eighties could be a decisive one for the future of mankind. Therefore, it is imperative that one becomes aware of where one's interest lie by adopting a different alternative, a different path where cooperation becomes everybody's business.

The alternative is to find countries with an average level of development and belonging to a regional area with common ties, either from a political or economic standpoint, to assess the basic elements and undertake a vigorous action according to their common interests.

One must start a process which could begin with young people and with a cooperation going from the "bottom up" (from the bottom to the top) likely to take us into the road to salvation.

8796

CSO: 3519/195

## INDUSTRIAL CREDIT BANK OPENS BILBAO BRANCH

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 26 Jan 84 p 9

[Text] Bilbao--The new branch of the Industrial Credit Bank was inaugurated at noon yesterday. To date, outstanding loans to businesses in the Basque Provinces total about 2,000 and amount to more than 90 billion pesetas, which represent 15.75 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively, of the national aggregate of such transactions and sums.

The bank is open for business at 3 Ercilla Street in Bilbao, thus providing continuity to a series of activities in the area going back to the start of operations in 1920, whose intensity in the past few months, as a result of the serious floods of August, was the factor that essentially determined the occupation of the premises ceded by the Postal Savings Bank.

With this new branch--three new branches are being projected for Victoria and San Sebastian--the bank intends to improve its operations in support of business and seeks a rapprochement in the study and solution of problems, thus welcoming the suggestions and wishes of customers in order to carry out its assigned social task, according to the statements of its president, Rafael Suner.

During fiscal year 1983, businesses in the Basque Provinces applied for 1,600 loans amounting to 70.872 billion pesetas, which represented 26.8 percent and 30.8 percent, respectively, of the corresponding national aggregates.

Some 1,261 loans were granted during the year in the amount of 30.185 billion pesetas, which constitutes 21 percent of the national figure. Vizcaya was the province that requested and received the most credit with a total of 897 loans amounting to 5.827 billion pesetas, and finally Alava with 78 loans amounting to 2.858 billion pesetas.

As to the breakdown of those figures in accordance with the object of the credit--aside from the extraordinary loans, which amounted to 22.057 billion pesetas--the maritime category ranked first with 4.269 billion pesetas. Industrial reconversion was next with 1.88 billion pesetas.

On the other hand, savings banks are paying special attention to applications submitted by individuals and companies in the commercial and services sectors pursuant to agreements made with the Official Credit Institute and the Industrial Credit Bank.



## WORLD BANK SECRET REPORT ON TURKISH HOUSING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Jan 84 pp 1,6

[Text] The president of the World Bank arrived in Turkey carrying a "secret housing report" with him. The report, entitled "4631-TU", while making new proposals for solving Turkey's housing problem nonetheless noted that the government's initiatives on this matter were on the right track. One important sector of the report concerned raising interest rates in the housing sector. Another important part of the report described the West City project now under construction in Ankara as a "model solution" to Turkey's housing problems.

The housing report which we understand was prepared by a committee headed by I.T. Christie from the World Bank, traced the process of urbanization in Turkey and stated that by the year 2000, 47 million people will live in the cities, a figure that equals Turkey's total population today. The report, which noted that 75 percent of the gross national product is absorbed by the cities, stressed that the housing problem in the cities has grown because emigration has fallen. The report also stated that presently only 75 percent of the housing demand is being met and it made the following observations about the government's initiatives on the housing question:

The environment is favorable for developing a new policy. Furthermore, government activities in the housing arena are on the right track to solving the problem. The housing report recommended that the policies implemented to solve the housing problem be designed to create employment and, thus, it suggested that heavy industrial technology not be brought so much to bear. After the wide-ranging introductory section of the report, attention was given to local administrations and the report stressed that these organizations are not given adequate resources to solve the housing shortage. In this section, which proposed that local administrations be allotted more resources, it recommended they also be given more autonomy in this regard. It suggested that Public Law 2561 be applied in regions where the population exceeds 300,000. The report proposed that local administrations create the city infrastructure--which is different from the way it has been done--and it suggested the creation of new foreign and domestic resources to achieve this goal.

For domestic sources the report pointed to the utility of local administrations issuing debentures and, abroad, of borrowing with Treasury backing.

The report noted that the "overnight housing" that sprouts up around the cities does not constitute areas of extreme poverty like the tin shack neighborhoods

in other countries. Instead, it said, in most cases the building supplies used here are in keeping with contemporary building standards.

The report noted that 270,000 dwellings are constructed annually but that only 120-140,000 are licensed. Hence there was a need for new initiatives. The report drew attention to the fact that generally housing construction was not up to contemporary practices, however an exception was the West City project being built by Ankara in cooperation with City Coop. The report noted that housing construction represented 6.4 percent of the gross national product in 1970 but that this figure fell to 3.9 percent in 1981. Pointing out that the banks were not involved in solving the housing problem, it made the following recommendations:

--Their direct assistance in solving the problem should be avoided. Instead they should be helpful in providing a source of capital and reasonable financing to the private citizen.

--The 100 square meter housing model should be dropped in favor of the 40-60 square meter model.

--Housing interest rates definitely must be raised. (In the draft law prepared by the Ozal government, the rates are projected to fall.)

--The losses arising from the low rates should be compensated for by a mortgage company that should be set up. Thus the Real Estate Bank should create a second market.

Following the proposals section in the World Bank Report, an evaluation was made of the Comprehensive Housing Fund. This appraisal said that the Fund created significant potential for lower cost housing construction however it recommended that some adjustments be made for using the system. The report stated that private dwelling acquisition practices must be in line with the Comprehensive Housing Fund, and as an example, said that the downpayment should cover 20 to 30 percent of the cost and credits the remainder.

The World Bank Report made special note of the West City housing project, which with 55,000 housing units represents the world's largest housing development. It stated that this project could be a model for all of Turkey and it added that to complete the West City project, the City Coop group which is carrying out the work must have absolute control over the worksites.

12280  
CSO: 3554/135

## SECTORAL ASSESSMENT OF 24 JANUARY POLICY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish. 24 Jan 84 pp 1,6

[Text] Here on the fourth anniversary of the 24 January decisions, we are continuing to present the views of political party representatives, businessmen and trade unionists on these decisions. MESS [Metal Products Industrialists Union] President Bahri Ersoz believes that "With the 24 January decisions, Turkey achieved stability." However, Cevdet Selvi, Petrol-Is Trade Union general chairman, argues, "We have not seen the slightest indication of the prosperity expected from the 24 January decisions." SODEP Deputy General Secretary Yigit Guloksuz says that some large holding and finance companies who earlier had been proponents of the 24 January decisions are now encountering major problems and Peoples Party M.P. Tulay Oney observes that the bankers' incidents which stemmed from the 24 January decisions have not been forgotten.

However, Abidin Cevher Ozden, known as the Kastelli Banker and who currently is in an office for financial organizations liquidations, contends, "With the 24 January decisions, the exploitation of peoples' savings by bankers has been blocked."

Metal Products Industrialists Union (MESS) President Bahri Ersoz: The 24 January decisions began a new era in Turkey. Prior to 1980, when these decisions were made, Turkey's economy was in severe crisis. Turkey was a least developed country and the 24 January decisions changed this outlook in the country. With these decisions, Turkey achieved a period of stability. Most important, the rate of inflation was decreased.

Petrol-Is Trade Union General Chairman Cevdet Selvi: Despite the economic hardships the people have endured since the January decisions, one cannot see even the slightest indications of the anticipated recovery. The reasons, applications and results are often in contradiction with one another. In the wake of the 24 January decisions, radical measures were taken, trade union rights were abridged and previously earned rights rolled back. Yet during this period instead of workers salaries rising, real wages fell by 30 percent. Seniority compensation was also reduced.

The Kastelli Banker

Abidin Cevher Ozden, known as the Kastelli Banker, gives his views as follows:

"Throughout the past four years, the 24 January decisions have been quite beneficial for Turkey. As far as I am concerned, you just cannot defend any position that argues these decisions have had a negative impact. The decisions demonstrated to the savings account owner the power and the value of money. People learned how to make money with money. The capital market was strengthened and people's savings accumulated. Most significant of all, bankers were prevented from exploiting the people's savings."

Foreign Capital Coordination Association (YASED) Chairman Erdogan Karakoyunlu: The 24 January decisions were unavoidable measures taken at a time when the Turkish economy had ground to a halt. It is impossible not to see the changes in the economic indicators as a result of the decisions made and of their implementation. National income climbed, exports rose and the balance of payments showed improvement. Combining these decisions with a simultaneous belt-tightening program did cause depression, shortages and stagnation in some sectors.

Peoples Party Istanbul M.P. Tulay Oney: The 24 January stabilization measures should be seen as a turning point in Turkey's economy. The regime of high interest rates prompted investment, paved the way to increased unemployment because of production and caused the bank catastrophe.

TUSIAD [Turkey Industrialists and Businessmen's Association] General Chairman Ali Kocman: Turkey made the 24 January decisions not by choice but from necessity. The victory in the 6 November elections of a political party that openly supported the principles of the 24 January decisions, its achievement of a working majority and the assembly's acceptance of a government program based on these principles demonstrate that these decisions will continue in force in the foreseeable future.

SODEP Assistant General Secretary Yigit Guloksuz: The results are obvious. Banks have folded one after another, worker and domestically owned companies are in dire financial straits. We know that finance groups and holding companies which were advocates of the 24 January decisions are now facing major problems. Putting the 24 January decisions into practice has been very damaging in their effects on the basic social framework.

Istanbul Exporters Union President Muammer Sahin: Had the 24 January decisions not been taken, the inflation rate would have reached 150 percent. However, because of the decision to halt inflation there was a pause on the domestic market. Nonetheless during this time trade aimed abroad developed and exports started up. In 1983 had we deviated from these decisions, the new decisions would have halted these deviations.

Sabancı Holding Company Chairman of the Board Sakip Sabancı: In the search for work for everyone, for more food for every pot, the 24 January decisions are at milepost one. Turkey has set out on a very appropriate path and now we must quickly advance along this road. It is incorrect to evaluate the 24 January decisions by themselves. We must recall the implementations that

followed these decisions and how Turkey came to these days from 24 January 1980. How quickly we have forgotten the lines, the stoves going out for want of fuel, the automobiles that would not work and the pans that would not cook for lack of margarine. Had we not had the 24 January 1980 decisions and their subsequent implementation, how could we have been rescued from these problems? Obviously we could not have been. We accepted the fate of shortages, we bent our knees, we sat by and the problems went on and grew larger. The administration of that time started out boldly on a new quest. Thanks to these decisions Turkey today is more advanced than it was on 24 January 1980.

12280

CSO: 3554/135

## IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF STAGNANT MINING INDUSTRY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 Feb 84 p 2

/Article by Behzat Firuz, mining engineer: "Our Mines"/

/Text/ The provisions of the government's program in connection with mining contain extremely important facts with respect to our mining industry.

It is worth pointing out that, while mining contributes significantly to development in many countries, in Turkey it does not measure up well at all compared to other sectors. In fact, ever since Law No.2172 went into effect in October 1978, our mining industry has suffered irreparable damage.

The problems of our mining industry are well stated in the program of the Csal government, and it is my belief that problems that have hung over our industry for years will be resolved shortly.

At this time, I would like to cite some important facts in connection with our subject and point out major things that Law No. 2172 brought to and took away from our mining industry.

Through Law No. 2172, our officials at the time were hoping to 'get off clean' so to speak, by blaming the private sector for the mistakes and poor practices for which they themselves were actually responsible in the long-neglected mining industry. The decisions adopted with regard to mining during that period (1978-1979) are full of mistakes and lacking in economic perspective.

1978-1979 was the beginning of a time when the private sector's contribution to mining could have been extremely useful. It was a time when private and even foreign capital were about to be channeled seriously into mining.

When Law No. 2172 was enacted --even when it was understood that it would be enacted-- both private and foreign capital abandoned our mining sector. It is mind-boggling to think that at a time



when even Red China was utilizing foreign technology and capital, Turkey was attempting to nationalize at this level.

Law No. 2840...

As a result of the 1978 nationalization, many well-organized and productive borax, iron and especially coal mining operations had to shut down for nearly five years. Consequently, production came to a complete halt, our citizens who were working these mines became unemployed, and several towns and villages became impoverished. Moreover, unemployment and poverty spread with the stoppage of all mining-related services.

The crisis periods that our country has gone through from time to time have dragged our economic and social life downhill. We can certainly cite production halts and unemployment as being among the main reasons for this downhill trend. Unless our production problem is properly resolved, development is out of the question for us. In 1950, Turkey ranked 36th in world mineral production. Eighteen more countries surpassed us by 1980, and we dropped to 54th place. Turkey has rather good potential in the area of mineral production, but substantial efforts are needed to develop this.

Although Law No. 2172 was repealed in the autumn of 1983 as a result of numerous initiatives and replaced by Law No. 2840, it seems that through the intentional efforts of certain circles Law No. 2840 is a virtual reaffirmation of Law No. 2172. Therefore, Law No. 2840 is contrary to our new economic policy and incompatible with the development of our mining industry.

Law No. 2840 needs to be amended through a new law, or a Mining Law suited to today's needs and requirements must replace Mining Law No. 6309.

Our mining industry had never reached a satisfactory level to begin with, but the enactment of Law No. 2172 sent it on a downhill course whose impact will continue to be felt for years. A law like Law No. 2172 can actually affect the development of developing countries. It creates the impression of being a measure taken against expanding private capital and needed foreign capital. Nationalization can lead to extremes, and it is one of the biggest mistakes made in 1978. The more time that passes since the enactment of Law No. 2172, the clearer the **negative** impact of this law on mineral production and exporting becomes, as production and exports keep declining.

The private sector has unique flexibility, drive and profit motive, and because of its structure, is able to outdo the state sector in all of these areas.

The mines that were nationalized in accordance with Law No. 2172 -- especially coal mines-- could not be operated by the state. The state turned them over to contractors who had nothing to do with mining and owned low-capacity equipment. Together the state and contractors set high unit prices. This created an overall jump in the cost of living in the country and caused unpleasant rumors.

If the mines had been worked by the private sector, the mining companies would have profited and the state would have collected the required tax revenues.

The private vs. state sector controversy must be left behind, and enterprises that were taken out of the mining industry because of pressures and ideological reasons, but have the money, the technology and the know-how, must be allowed to operate our mines. The private sector must not be looked at as if it were some monster. The private sector's unique features (the flexibility, creative power and greater productivity of free enterprise) must be utilized, and the private sector must be properly charged with the task of operating our mines by being given the necessary resources and operating guarantees.

Laws that would enable the state to nationalize any mines whenever it feels like doing so must never be allowed. The negative effects that such laws have had upon our mining industry and mineral exports become clearer as time passes.

Above all, all mining activities in the private and state sector, including the marketing of mining products, must be conducted under supervision and control of the state. Despite the fact that Mining Law No. 6309, which has been in effect for 29 years, dictates that mining activities in our country are to be conducted under state supervision and control, the provision has never been enforced. Thus, the private sector has been unjustly accused of the downhill trend that has occurred as a result of lack of control.

Since it is possible, based on Law No. 6309, to cancel mineral rights of mines that are being poorly or improperly operated, compensation paid by the state in the course of nationalization procedures was unjustified and unnecessary. Such mines ought to have been turned over to the state anyway.

The continued shortcomings of our laws in connection with mining, erroneous practices, failure to take necessary steps on time (or at all), and Nationalization Law No. 2172 have all caused our country's mineral production to decline, planned output to fall far below goals and exports to decrease. Apart from mining, however, Turkey has made significant progress in overall exports.

## One Shortcoming of the Laws

One of the illogical practices standing in the way of the development of our mining industry is the fact that the laws do not include mining products as industrial products or mining activities as industrial activities.

Thus, mining and mining products fail to benefit from the interest and incentive measures which industries and products that are so accepted benefit from in all stages from production through sales. This is why the failure of the laws to include mining as an industrial activity and mining products as industrial products must be dealt with quickly. The mining sector must be able to develop rapidly by availing itself of tax rebates on products, corporate tax exemptions on exports, and similar incentives.

Those who will be getting involved in mining need a credit organization for their investments, initial operations and expansion aimed at increasing production.

Mining has been unable to claim more than a 2 percent share in our GNP. This, plus the fact that its share in our growing volume of exports dropped to 4.75 percent in 1981, to 3.6 percent in 1982 and is still declining, proves that our situation with regard to mining is not a pleasant one at all. It also confirms our President's statements relative to the mining industry.

The discrimination between the private and state sector, as well as the hostility, must be ended. The sectors must establish joint companies, if necessary. It would be very useful for them to engage in joint initiatives particularly in working large mines or the coalfields that supply thermal power plants. Also, by concentrating more on extremely-lacking infrastructural facilities, the state must either work together with the private sector in the area of business administration, or else help the private sector act on its own.

## What We Expect

The new mining laws must contain explicit provisions absolutely guaranteeing domestic and foreign capital. All provisions or ideas making reference to nationalization must be kept out of the laws. In contacts we have had with investor countries (Great Britain, Germany, the U.S., Romania, etc.), they have all said that they would not consider investing in Turkey as long as Law No. 2172 is in effect. The same holds true for Law No. 2840.

The following principles must be contained in the new mining law under consideration as a replacement for Law No. 6309:

a) The mining regime must be arranged in accordance with the pertinent articles of our Constitution. (Article 168)

b) The private and state sector must be recognized as equals in the new Mining Law.

Both sectors must be subject to constant and effective control and monitoring by the state in all mining activities.

c) Exploration rights accorded the Mining Research Institute must be no different from those accorded the private sector.

d) Marble and similar substances must be included under the scope of the new law.

e) A new Quarry Law based on current needs must be enacted in place of the Quarry Regulation. This law must be monitored and enforced by the Mining Office (Directorate General of Mining).

f) In cases requiring revocation of rights or licenses, the miner must be forewarned at least twice through incurrence of substantial fines.

g) A permanent committee which will be formed within the framework of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, reinforced with personnel from outside, and responsible to the Ministry must be empowered to make decisions on important matters.

h) Nationalized mines must be able to be returned to the owners on terms non-detrimental to the state.

Mining laws similar to the recent Petroleum Law essentially suit our purpose. Above all, the subject of strategic mines has been handled all wrong by those concerned.

Opportunities must be given to the activities of the private sector, whose continually profitable operations and payment of taxes to the state we have already discussed. The state must take charge of all infrastructural activities as well as possible.

However, in all of these activities, the state must thoroughly fulfill its duty of supervision and control.

12279

CSO: 3554/148

## HIGH ELECTRICITY PRICES AFFECT COMPETITIVENESS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 13 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by one of the editors: "Van Aardenne. Electricity Prices in The Netherlands More and More Unfavorable"]

[Text] Rotterdam, 13 Jan--Because of the construction of nuclear electricity plants in other (West European) countries, the electricity prices there may go on decreasing, and the present, bad competitive position of the Netherlands is being further impaired. This emphasizes the necessity of quickly made decisions about the fuel supply of the plants in the next 10 years. Minister Van Aardenne says this in response to questions from the Dutch house of representatives.

According to the latest forecasts, in the year 1990, the Netherlands will generate only six percent of its electricity by means of nuclear energy. This share lags far behind countries like France (70 percent), the UK (28 percent), Germany (39 percent), Belgium (51 percent), and the United States (23 percent). It is true that the share of coal in electricity generation here increases to 40 percent in 1990, but also in that respect the UK, Germany and the United States score considerably higher, so it appears from a survey which Van Aardenne supplied to the House.

The share of oil and gas, relatively expensive fuels, will in 1990 still amount to 54 percent in the Netherlands, while in other countries it is being diminished drastically, and in France is even being reduced to zero.

Our country does not yet come unfavorably, however, out of a simultaneously furnished comparison of the electricity prices for August 1982. For the small consumers, only electricity in France is cheaper, and Belgium and Germany are considerably more expensive. Only at a consumption of some tens of millions of kilowatt-hours per year does the Dutch position become more unfavorable. For the very large consumers (from 70 million kilowatt-hours per year), however, our country is still in line with Belgium and Germany (slightly over 11 Dutch cents per kilowatt-hour), but these figures give a flattering picture because of the restitution on the electricity price, which is given in our country to large firms. That discount is possible because of the temporary use of extra natural gas in the electricity plants.



In the government's stand on the energy policy for the coming years, which will appear after the conclusion of the public discussion on energy (the final report on this will appear in little more than a week), there will mainly have to be made a choice, according to Van Aardenne, in favor of either coal, and/or nuclear energy. Gas and oil do not come under consideration, according to the Minister, because of their prices, and in view of the EEC policy, whereas only a limited contribution can be expected from alternative means of energy generation.

12568

CSO: 3614/34



## SURVEY, FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENEFITS OF TKI PROJECTS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 17 Jan 84 p 7

[Text] Upon completion of 13 major projects being undertaken by TKI (Turkish Coal Enterprises), Turkey will save an estimated \$2.2 billion a year in foreign exchange. The total cost of the projects currently underway is projected at 368.5 billion T.L.

Based on the assumption that crude oil costs Turkey \$240 per ton, the project that will be the biggest money-saver for Turkey is the lignite project being carried out for the Afsin-Elbistan Thermal Plant. Completion of this project is programmed for 1986. It is to cost a total of 145.1 billion T.L. and will produce 20 Mt/y (Million tons a year) of coal when operating at full capacity. Nearly 16 billion T.L. was allocated for the project in 1984, and \$55 million in foreign credits is presently needed for the facilities and thermal plant to go into operation.

#### Other Major Projects

The cost and status of TKI's 12 other major projects are reflected below:

#### Sivas-Kangal Project

The Sivas-Kangal Facilities site has reserves of 26.2 Mt (Million tons). Output is projected at 4.2 Mt/y. Completion is set for 1986. The facilities will cost an estimated 25.3 billion T.L. and are expected to save Turkey \$145.6 million a year in foreign exchange. Much of the machinery and equipment for the project had to be ordered, and assembly work is continuing. U.S. Eximbank credits in the amount of \$18.6 million and Japan Eximbank credits of \$25 million have gone into this. Additional equipment on order is also being covered by Japan Eximbank credits of \$15 million.

### Beypazari Expansion Project

Reserves at the Beypazari facilities total 105.2 Mt. This project will increase production at the site by 3Mt/y. It is scheduled for completion in 1985, with production goals being set at 1.17 Mt/y [sic] of industrial and heating coal. Estimated cost of the project is 19.8 billion T.L. It is expected to yield a savings of \$240 million a year in foreign currency. A total of \$20 million in EC credits has been provided for the facilities, and efforts are currently underway to secure an additional \$50 million in foreign credits.

### Mugla-Yatagan Project

This project is scheduled for completion in 1984. The site has reserves of 106.1 Mt and its expected output is 3.5 Mt/y of lignite. A total of 3 billion T.L. will be spent on the project in 1984, with overall cost running 13.8 billion T.L. Upon completion of the facilities, the project will mean a savings of \$196 million a year in foreign exchange. The facilities will produce 2100 Btu lignite.

### Milas-Sekkoy Project

This project has reserves of 81.6 Mt located in Sekkoy and 67.1 Mt in Ekizkoy. Of the total projected output of 4.1 Mt/y, 3.75 Mt of lignite will contribute 2 X 250 MW thermal power. The project will cost 20 billion T.L. A total of \$65 million in credits has been provided by U.S. Eximbank.

### Tinaz-Bagkimya Project

This project is expected to cost nearly 18 billion T.L. A total of 1.85 Mt/y of lignite is to be extracted from its reserves of 49 Mt, and 1.75 Mt of this will be used at the 1 X 210 MW thermal plant. The facilities are programmed for completion in 1987 and will save Turkey \$83.9 million in foreign exchange annually. U.S. Eximbank has provided credits in the amount of \$44 million.

### Soma-Isiklar Project

Upon completion of this 21 billion T.L. project, 2.4 Mt/y of coal will be produced. It will mean a savings of \$198.4 million a year for Turkey. All of the coal will be consumed at the 4 X 165 MW thermal plant that is to be built in the same location. The World Bank has provided credits of \$50 million for this project, which is expected to be completed in 1987.

### Soma-Deniz I Project

Scheduled for completion in 1986, this project is to provide lignite for the 4 X 165 MW thermal plant that will operate on 1.5 Mt/y of 2670 Btu coal. Cost is estimated at 12 billion T.L. A portion of the machinery and equipment for the project has been ordered through \$30 million in credits obtained from Japan Eximbank. The site's reserves total 45 Mt. The project is expected to save Turkey \$107 million a year in foreign exchange.

### Bursa-Orhaneli Project

This project is being carried out with the goal of producing 1.6 Mt/y of 2500 Btu coal from the 44 Mt reserves at the site. The facilities will supply 1.31 Mt/y of coal for the 1 X 250 MW thermal plant there. The project will mean a savings of \$106.7 million a year for Turkey. U.S. Eximbank has furnished credits in the amount of \$40 million for these facilities, which are to be completed in 1985.

### Bursa-Keles Project

This site has 46.4 Mt of 1800 Btu lignite reserves. It will save Turkey \$96 million in foreign exchange annually upon completion in 1987. Total cost of the project is 20.8 billion T.L. The 1 X 200 MW thermal plant will be supplied with raw material through the project. In addition, 400 Tt/y (Thousand tons a year) of coal will be extracted for heating and industry. \$50 million in foreign credits needed for the project have yet to be obtained.

### Canakkale-Car Project

This project was to be completed in 1987, but foreign credits have yet to be forthcoming. Reserves at the site total 113.4 Mt and production goals are set at 1.5 Mt/y. The project will cost 33.1 billion T.L. and will save Turkey \$110 million in foreign exchange annually. The site contains 2750 Btu lignite deposits, and entire production is to be used for heating and industry.

### Seyitomer IV Expansion Project

This project will produce 1.55 Mt/y of 1800 Btu lignite and will be completed in 1986. The 33.1 billion T.L. facility is being established at the Seyitomer Lignite Site with reserves of 211 Mt. The project is being conducted through the use of U.S. Eximbank credits and will mean a savings of \$74.4 million a year in foreign exchange.

## Bingol-Karlioova Project

Reserves at this site total 26 Mt. Output is projected at 1.1 Mt/y of 1400 Btu lignite. No decision has been made yet with regard to the thermal plant. The project is expected to cost 11.1 billion T.L. and will mean a savings of \$41 million a year in foreign exchange. However, investment has not begun since TEK (Turkish Electric Power Enterprise) has not made its final decision.

12279

CSO: 3554/132

## SANT CARLES OIL EXPLORATION SPARKS ECOLOGICAL FUROR

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 28 Jan 84 p 5

[Article by Gloria Escrig, Special Correspondent]

[Text] Sant Carles de la Rapita (Montsia) --The residents of Sant Carles de la Rapita have different opinions when it comes to the new oil well discovered Thursday off the coast of their municipality. Some fear that the fishing probably will be affected; others recall the times of crisis and unemployment and think that the working of the new well will be beneficial.

The new oil field is called Salmonete-1 [Red Mullet-1], as we were informed yesterday, and it is located 50 kilometers from Sant Carles de la Rapita and 45 kilometers from Tarragona. The drilling will be done by a group of companies, among the government-run ENIEPSA [expansion unknown]. The others are Union Texas, Getty and Mendosa. The well is expected to produce 3,500 barrels a day of API grade 44 petroleum, which in non-technical terms means that it is very good, finer than Saudi Arabian petroleum, which is API grade 34. The company has declared its intention to make an effort to find new oil potential and, if this is API grade 44, which is better because its lightness and low sulphur content make it easier to refine. The estimated benefits come close to 6 billion pesetas annually.

Some of the residents of Sant Carles were not at all sure that this money would benefit them. The company, however, intends to continue making tests until the first two weeks in February so as to find out what the gauge [via] of the well can be. This information was to be collected in Madrid because the executives of ENIEPSA in Sant Carles refused to facilitate it on orders from headquarters in the capital of the country.

One of the residents declared to AVUI that working the new well would create more problems for fishing: "Petroleum working and research on the coasts of Tarragona in general has created problems for fishing because of the residues and pollution. It is all right for them to take oil out, but let them solve at once the problems that the petroleum industry has occasioned and continues to occasion off the coasts of Tarragona." It should be recalled that in this area of the Catalan coast there is a

cluster of different oil fields: Casablanca, the biggest, with five drillings, Daurada [Golden], with two, Amposta and Tarraco with one each and now, Salmonete. The resident's worry has a basis, according to what he told us, in this accumulation of wells.

#### Possibility of Work

There were other people in Sant Carles who thought more about the present economic crisis than about the ecology in time to anticipate whether the new well would benefit them or not. One woman told us: "The people who work at the new well already have assured work. I think this is good." Her husband made a description that tried to handle the matter more technically: "We are in a very deep crisis and the new well will make it possible for us not to have to import so much oil from Saudi Arabia. Besides, I have read that it is a petroleum of high quality and this also is very important."

Most of the people we talked to were more favorable to the environmentalist positions. "It does us little good for us to have work if later on we can not live because of the pollution from the wells. I don't have a car and I can do without oil. We would all travel better by bike," a 20-year-old boy told us. "I'm partial to good eating, and for that you can't have contaminated fish. The wells get polluted and I don't like that," added one of the companions of the first boy.

A third person also explained his thoughts on the matter: "My pals are right, but it should be recalled that there are people working there who otherwise would possibly be unemployed. In spite of everything, I would not like it either if the sea and the beaches were filthy."

12448

CSO: 3548/181

END



**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

16 MARCH 1984

---

BR